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My dissertation explores the importance of corporate governance from the 
perspective of bondholders of samples of US financial and industrial firms. It consists of 
three related essays which collectively cohere to represent my understanding of the topic. 
The conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders and between corporate 
insiders and outside capital providers are addressed to explain the impact of a 
comprehensive governance mechanisms on bondholder wealth, which is measured either 
by the default probability implied by the structure credit model or by Credit Default Swap 
(CDS) spread. I consider both the non-crisis and crisis periods through different essays, 
which provide the ideal setting to examine the effectiveness of governance on bondholder 
wealth for different market conditions. Specifically, I explain how important governance 
provisions affect a manager’s opportunistic behavior, a firm’s investment decision and 
risk-taking behavior, and information environment, which in turn affect bondholder 
wealth. Such governance provisions include internal governance mechanism, such as the 
role played by the board of directors and a firm’s equity ownership structure, and external 
governance provisions through the market for corporate control and the trading activities 
of institutional investors. My dissertation serves to advance the governance literature in 
several dimensions: a) it re-examines the usefulness of shareholder favorable governance 
iv 
 
provisions from a different angle through the eye of creditors, and tries to explain why 
some shareholder governance provisions turn out to be ineffective; b) it compares the 
riskiness of financial and non-financial firms, and how creditors view governance factors 
differently for two types of firms; c) it emphasizes the role of institutional investors and 
tests how their investment horizons and ownership levels affect industrial firms’ riskiness, 
and how such an impact varies across different market conditions. My general results 
show that governance attributes have a significant impact on a firm’s credit risk, and this 
impact varies across the type of the firm. Ownership structure and takeover vulnerability 
are more important for non-financial firms than for financial firms. Board structure and 
accounting transparency have greater impact on financial firms. When I restrict to a 
sample of banks and use the credit risk model to estimate default risk, the impact of board 
structure remains. Given the important governance role of equity ownership structure for 
non-financial firms and the importance of institutional investors in the U.S. capital 
markets, I specifically look at institutional monitoring on industrial firms’ credit risk. My 
results show that institutional investment horizon, ownership structure, trading behavior 












I would like to gratefully and sincerely thank my supervisor, Dr. Lorne Switzer. 
His guidance, wisdom, encouragement and understanding have made completion of my 
dissertation possible. I have learned so much from him and am honoured to have had the 
opportunity to work with him throughout my Ph.D. education at Concordia University.  
I also want to acknowledge the contributions of my other committee members, Dr. 
Thomas Walker and Dr. Bryan Campbell from Concordia University, Dr. Jean-Claude 
Cosset (prior committee member) and Dr. Jean-Guy Simonato from HEC Montreal, and 
Dr. Betty Simkins from Oklahoma State University. I appreciate their helpful comments 
on the draft of my dissertation and contributions.  
I am particularly indebted to my parents for their unconditional love, support and 
extraordinary sacrifices they have made for me. I dedicate this dissertation to my dearest 
parents who instilled in me the importance of self-improvement and education, and 
always support me. I would like to thank all my family members and friends for their 










Table of Contents 
List of Tables................................................................................................................viii 
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Default Risk and Corporate Governance in Financial vs. Non-Financial Firms12 
2.1 Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 14 
2.2 Governance Attributes and Default Spreads ..................................................................... 17 
2.2.1 Board structure variables: size, expertise, and independence ..................................... 17 
2.2.2 Firm’s Financial Transparency .................................................................................. 19 
2.2.3 Firm’s Takeover Vulnerability .................................................................................. 20 
2.2.4 CEO Power and Ownership ...................................................................................... 21 
2.3 Data Description ............................................................................................................. 22 
2.4 Empirical Results ............................................................................................................ 25 
2.5 Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................................... 28 
Chapter 3: Default Risk Estimation, Bank Credit Risk, and Corporate Governance ........ 30 
3.1 The Credit Risk Model .................................................................................................... 32 
3.2 Corporate Governance Hypotheses .................................................................................. 35 
3.3 Data Description ............................................................................................................. 38 
3.4 Empirical Results ............................................................................................................ 40 
3.5 Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................................... 44 
Chapter 4: Institutional Investment Horizon, the Information Environment and Firm 
Credit Risk .................................................................................................................... 45 
4.1 Development of Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 48 
4.1.1 Short-term Institutional Investors and Credit Risk ..................................................... 48 
4.1.2 Long-term Institutional Investors and Credit Risk ..................................................... 51 
4.1.3 Concentrated Ownership, Shareholder Activism and Credit Risk .............................. 53 
4.2. Data and Methodology ................................................................................................... 55 
4.2.1 Data and Sample ....................................................................................................... 55 
vii 
 
4.2.2 Classification of Short- and Long-term Institutional Investors ................................... 57 
4.2.3 Empirical Methodology ............................................................................................ 60 
4.3 Regression Results .......................................................................................................... 63 
4.3.1 Institutional Ownership and CDS spreads ................................................................. 63 
4.3.2 Concentrated Ownership, Shareholder Activism and Credit Risk .............................. 65 
4.3.3 Crisis vs. Non-crisis Period ....................................................................................... 66 
4.3.4 Robustness Test ........................................................................................................ 68 
4.4 Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................................... 70 
Chapter 5: Conclusions .................................................................................................. 72 
References ..................................................................................................................... 76 
Figures .......................................................................................................................... 84 




     List of Tables 
 
      Tables for Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................ 86 
Table 1: Variable definition and Sources ..................................................................... 86 
    Table 2: Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................... 87 
Table 3: Pearson Correlations ..................................................................................... 90 
Table 4: Regression Results with CDS_5y as dependent variable ................................ 92 
Table 5: Regression Results with netcash ratio as dependent variable for industrial 
firms ........................................................................................................................... 93 
       Tables for Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................... 94 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................... 94 
Table 7: Five year default probabilities for each year for 2001-2010 ........................... 95 
Table 8: Summary of OLS Regression Results ............................................................ 96 
        Tables for Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................ 100 
Table 9: Variable Definition and Data Sources .......................................................... 100 
Table 10: Summary Statistics .................................................................................... 101 
Table 11: Determinants of institutional ownership .................................................... 104 
Table 12: Hausman (1978) tests of Endogeneity........................................................ 106 
Table 13: Impact of institutional ownership and trading on firms’ credit spreads ....... 107 
Table 14: Impact of concentrated ownership on firms’ credit spreads ........................ 109 
Table 15: Crisis vs. normal period ............................................................................. 110 
Table 16: Institutional ownership and CDS contracts with different maturities .......... 112 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
My dissertation consists of three related essays exploring the topic of corporate 
governance, credit risk and bondholder wealth. Corporate governance is defined by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) as “Corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.” Denis and McConnell (2003) define corporate governance a set of 
mechanisms “that induce self-interested corporate controllers (those that make decisions 
regarding how the company will be operated) to make decisions that maximize the value 
of the company to its owners (the suppliers of capital).” The separation between 
ownership and control leads to agency conflicts, together with the information asymmetry 
problem, allowing self-interested corporate insiders to transfer a firm’s resources to 
themselves at the expense of the suppliers of capital. Such behavior could impair a firm’s 
overall financial situation, leaving creditors, and not just shareholders vulnerable to 
losses.
1
 By both definitions, corporate governance mechanisms are designed to benefit 
not only stockholders (hereafter referred to as shareholders), but also bondholders. As a 
matter of fact, debt financing has been an important and major financing method for U.S. 
firms.
 2
 Bondholders’ interests should also be one of the primary concerns to corporations, 
investors and policymakers. However, following the agency model of Jensen and 
                                                             
1
  The term “creditor” refers to a party (person, organization, company, or government) that is the lender of 
property, service or money, and has a claim of a second party (called debtor or borrower). As bondholder 
is the most important type of creditor, creditors and bondholders are used interchangeable in my 
dissertation. 
2  For example, in 1980 (2009), total outstanding bonds in the US amounted to $3,569 billion ($34,747 




Meckling (1976), there is an extensive literature that looks at the effects of corporate 
governance on shareholders, and the conflicts of interests between corporate insiders and 
shareholders. The Best Practices approach of policymakers and practitioners is in part 
based on academic studies that demonstrate that corporate governance mechanisms can 
significantly affect stock prices and shareholder wealth. Furthermore, as noted by Baker, 
Greenwood and Wurgler (2003, Page 262): “Relative to the literature on equity financing 
patterns, and relative to the actual importance of debt finance in the U.S. economy, the 
literature on debt financing patterns is surprisingly underdeveloped”. Given the 
importance of debt financing for US firms, it is surprising that the literature on the impact 
of governance mechanisms on bondholder wealth is relatively underdeveloped for both 
financial and non-financial firms. My dissertation attempts to provide new evidence on 
this score, and looks at the impact of comprehensive governance attributes on bondholder 
wealth. The global financial crisis of 2007-08 also motivates this research. Credit risk of 
banks is recognized as a key feature of the liquidity panic in the US financial system and 
the recent global financial crisis. 3  This risk has been attributed to poor governance 
practices, although very few studies have actually tried to measure the impact of 
governance on credit risk for financial firms directly. In this dissertation, I try to find out 
whether there a direct link between governance and the credit market and credit crisis. 
Governance mechanisms in the U.S. can be broadly characterized as being either 
internal or external to the firm (Denis and McConnell, 2003). The internal mechanisms of 
primary interest include monitoring by the board of directors and the firm’s equity 
ownership structure. Board characteristics such as board composition, size, independency, 
                                                             
3   See Financial Stability Board, Bank for International Settlements Senior Supervisors Group, “Risk 
Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008.” 
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expertise, diversity and board major tasks such as determining the level and structure of 
executive compensation, all have an impact on firm performance and valuation based on 
previous literature
4
. Therefore, corporate governance could affect bondholder wealth as 
well because priced corporate bonds can be regarded as contingent claims on the firm’s 
assets. A firm’s equity ownership structures such as the identity of shareholders and size 
of their stock holdings are both relevant factors as they determine the incentive and 
power for shareholders to monitor the firm. More importantly, the ownership level could 
also help intensify or reduce the conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
bondholders, and between equity blockholder and minority shareholders and bondholders. 
Therefore, ownership structure also affects bondholder wealth. The external governance 
mechanisms mainly include monitoring by the takeover market and the legal system that 
protects investors’ rights. The takeover market, or market for corporate control, has been 
very active in the U.S. When a firm performs badly, there is an incentive for outside 
parties to seek control of the firm. Poorly performing firms are more likely to be the 
target and managers of poorly performing firms are more likely to be fired. Therefore, the 
mere threat of change in control can provide managers incentive to keep firm value high 
and avoid an attack from the outside parties. Therefore, in the U.S., active takeover 
market disciplines managers and reduces the shareholder/manager agency problem. On 
the other hand, the takeover market might intensify the agency problem by providing 
mangers a channel of empire building rather than acting on behalf of shareholders. 
Compared with other countries, the securities laws are well developed in the U.S., and the 
legal systems that protect investors’ rights are also important external governance 
                                                             
4  See Denis and McConnel (2003) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for reviews of the related literature. 
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mechanisms in the U.S. Filing and regular disclosure requirements by the stock 
exchanges and the SEC as well as shareholder litigation are all effective ways to reduce 
the information asymmetry problem, discipline firm managers, and protect investors. 
Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted as a reaction to a number 
of major corporate and accounting scandals, and benefit firms and investors by increasing 
corporate transparency, improving the firms’ internal controls, increasing investors’ 
confidence of financial reporting, and reducing capital costs.
5
 To sum up, governance 
mechanisms that intend to reduce managerial opportunistic behaviors could also benefit 
bondholders. In addition, governance mechanisms that improve firm’s information 
environment also benefit bondholder and reduce credit risk as the information 
environment is extremely important for bondholders to assess a firm’s credit risk. Since 
the seminal work of Merton (1974), many structural credit models price corporate debt as 
contingent claims over the asset value of the issuing firm. In practice, however, it is 
difficult for investors in the secondary credit market to observe a firm’s assets directly, so 
they have to infer an issuer’s credit quality from the available accounting data and other 
publicly available information (e.g., Duffie and Lando, 2001, Maxwell and Miller, 2004, 
Yu, 2005). Therefore, governance provisions favoring shareholders that constrain 
managerial opportunistic behavior and mitigate information asymmetry between 
corporate insiders and outside capital providers could also benefit bondholders.  
However, governance mechanisms favoring shareholder might not benefit 
bondholders due to the conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders. 
Shareholders might expropriate bondholder wealth in various forms such as encourage 
                                                             
5 See, among others, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and LaFond (2007), Rittenberg and Miller (2005), 
Arping and Sautner (2013).  
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risk shifting, a.k.a. risk substitution, constitute debt overhang problem, affect dividend 
payment policy, and influence firms’ takeovers and restructuring activities. In other 
words, powerful shareholders could transfer bondholder wealth to themselves and 
constitute a wealth transfer problem due the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
bondholders. This problem increases the agency cost of debt. There are different forms of 
expropriation by shareholder of bondholder wealth. 1) Risk Shifting: Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) propose a risk shifting/asset substitution problem that stockholders have 
incentives to force managers to invest in new projects that are extremely risky to increase 
both the mean and the variance of future cash flows. As a consequence, their creditors 
bear higher default risk, while limited liability shareholders benefit if the project is 
successful. Thus, convexity in cash flow payoffs will increase levered firms’ default 
probabilities, which will benefit shareholders at the expense of bondholders. Bhojaraj and 
Sengupta (2003) find that concentrated ownership by institutional investors (higher 
shareholder power) has an adverse impact on bond yield and rating.  John, Litov, and 
Yeung (2008) show a positive relation between investor protection and firm’s risk-taking 
for manufacturing firms. 2) Debt Overhang: As noted by Myers (1977), firms near or in 
financial distress may not be able to exploit promising valuable projects because 
shareholders are unwilling to finance these projects, which will lower their expected 
future cash flows and increase their risk of bankruptcy. 3) Dividend payment policy: 
Dhillon and Johnson (1994) show that bondholder have a negative response to dividend 
increases. 4) Takeover and restricting: Firms with strong shareholder rights and weak 
managerial power (weak anti-takeover provisions) are more vulnerable to takeover, 
resulting in increased leverage, especially in the case of leveraged buyouts (e.g. Warga 
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and Welch, 1993, Billett, Jiang and Lie, 2010). Increase in leverage implies an increase in 
the probability and the deadweight cost of a possible future bankruptcy and reordering 
the claims priority in bankruptcy, therefore reducing the value of the outstanding bonds.
 6
 
Hence, bondholders of firms with strong shareholder rights will demand higher credit 
spreads as compensation for the added risk they face (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986), Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005, Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007). Klock, Mansi 
and Maxwell (2005) examine  antitakeover provisions, as proxied by the Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) G-Index, on bond yield spreads and find that weak shareholder rights 
(strong antitakeover provisions) lower the cost of debt financing, suggesting that 
antitakeover provisions benefit bondholders. Cremers et al. (2007) find that higher 
institutional block holdings (higher shareholder rights) are associated with higher yields 
if the firm is exposed to takeovers. Parrino (1997) illustrates the wealth transfer from 
bondholders to shareholders in the case of the Marriott spinoff. In addition, my 
dissertation also looks at the impact of shareholders, especially institutional shareholders 
with concentrated ownership on minority shareholders and bondholders. The results 
imply that there is an evidence of expropriation by shareholders with concentrated 
ownership of other stakeholders. Therefore, the conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and bondholders will complicate the problem of identifying governance variables that 
serve both, and the impact of governance provisions on bondholder wealth is partially an 
empirical question that I will explore in my dissertation.  
                                                             
6
  Bond covenants that prevent from issuing bonds of equal or higher seniority may not protect existing 
bondholders as the covenants might not hold in the case of financial distress. Warner (1977), Barrett and 
Sullivan (1988), Franks and Torous (1989), Weiss (1990), and Eberhart et al. (1990), among others, 
show evidence of violations of absolute priority rule (APR): Bankruptcy reorganization proceedings are 




Formally, credit risk is defined as the risk of loss due to debtor’s non-payment of 
the principal or interest on a loan or a specific line of credit in a timely manner. Such an 
event is called a default.  In my dissertation, I use credit risk or default probability to 
measure bondholder wealth: ceteris paribus, higher credit risk/default probability implies 
lower bondholder wealth.
7
 I use the Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread for my first and 
third essays, and use default probabilities estimated through structure models for my 
second essay as my sample of U.S. commercial and savings banks do not have sufficient 
CDS information. Previous studies have used several variables to measure bondholder 
wealth or the cost of debt financing. For industrial firms, the measurements mainly 
include corporate bond yield spreads (see, e.g. Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005, 
Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007), credit ratings (see, e.g. Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006), credit default swap spreads (see, e.g. Yu, 
2005, Carlson and Lazrak, 2010), and other accounting variables and restrictive model 
based default probabilities. For financial firms, the commonly used measures of risk are 
market-based indicators such as stock returns volatility, or accounting-based risk 
measurement such as the z-score, or income variation (see, e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2009, 
Saunders, Strock and Travlos,1990). For my first (Chapter 2) and third (Chapter 4) essays, 
I use CDS spread to measure bondholder wealth/credit risk/default probability.  
A CDS is an over-the-counter contract, where the protection buyer makes a fixed 
premium payment, the spread, to the protection seller to exchange for compensation if 
certain pre-specified credit event occurs. Hull, Predescu and White (2004) explain the 
                                                             
7  In my dissertation, I use the default probability of credit spread to measure bondholder wealth, recovery 
rate is not considered here. The quoted CDS spreads reflect the participants’ belief of the default risk in a 
timely basis and reasonably reflect the firm’s credit risk in an efficient market.  
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attractive features of CDS spreads as proxies for default spread. CDS quoted spreads 
provided by a broker from dealers reflect the dealer’s commitment to trade. Bond yield 
spreads and credit ratings provided by commercial rating companies reflect no 
commitments for the bond to be traded at listed prices or ratings. Secondly, the CDS 
spread does not require a benchmark risk-free rate, as it is already quoted in the spread 
directly. Bond yield spreads are based on a potentially questionable benchmark risk free 
rate (Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo, 2009). Thirdly, there is a greater variation of CDS 
spreads than credit ratings, that is, there are various CDS spreads within a given credit 
rating, which is more useful for empirical research. Fourthly, CDS spreads reflect firms’ 
credit risk levels more accurately than bond spreads as the latter might also incorporate 
non-default components including liquidity and tax effects (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 
2005). Finally, as the CDS spreads are quoted on a daily bases, they can better reflect 
current public information and capture the participants’ responses and perceptions in a 
timely bases. On the other hand, bond quotes from the secondary market are updated no 
frequently than a monthly basis. Therefore, CDS data can be used by researchers, 
regulators, and financial practitioners to monitor how the market views credit risk of any 
entity on which a CDS is available. Based on these considerations, I use CDS spreads as 
my major dependent variable in my dissertation. However, as the sample of U.S. 
commercial and savings banks for my second essay (Chapter 3) does not enough CDS 
information, I use a structural credit model to estimate the default probability as a 
measurement of bondholder wealth. 
My first essay compares the credit risk of financial firms with those of non-
financial firms, and investigates the different impacts of major internal governance 
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mechanisms and external market monitoring through the threat of potential takeovers on 
the credit risk of financial and non-financial firms, respectively. My results show that 
financial firms generally have lower credit spread levels and volatilities than non-
financial firms. Governance attributes have differential effects across firm types: board 
independence and financial transparency have a greater impact on credit risk of financial 
firms than on non-financial firms. Ownership structure and takeover vulnerability are 
more important for non-financial firms than for financial firms. For non-financial firms, 
CEO ownership has a nonlinear relation with credit risk levels with an inflection point of 
around 40%: at ownership levels below (above) the inflection point, increased CEO 
ownership is associated with increased (decreased) credit risk. These results are 
consistent with both an incentive alignment and entrenchment effects: at a low level of 
ownership, the interests of CEOs are more aligned to shareholders than bondholders, but 
at a high level of ownership, the CEO’s interest is more aligned with those of 
bondholders. For financial firms, CEO ownership is associated with lower default 
probability only when CEOs hold a large fraction of the firm’s shares. 
My second essay estimates the default probabilities of a panel of U.S. commercial 
and savings banks using a structural credit model and examines the impact of internal 
governance mechanisms such as monitoring by the board of directors and equity 
ownership structure on the default probabilities of U.S. banks. The estimated five-year 
cumulative default probabilities are time-varying, with a significant jump observed in the 
year prior to the financial crisis of 2008.
8
  Generally speaking, corporate governance 
                                                             
8  Camara, Popova and Simkins (2009), among other, find a similar pattern. I.e., there is an upward trend 
during June 2007 to October 2008 for the 20-day moving average of the default probability for 144 
global financial firms with traded option in the U.S.     
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structures have a greater impact on US commercial banks than savings institutions. After 
controlling for firm specific characteristics, commercial banks with larger boards and 
older CFOs are associated with significantly lower credit risk levels.  Lower ownership 
by institutional investors and more independent boards are also associated with having 
lower credit risk levels, although these effects are somewhat less significant. For all the 
banks in my sample, large board size and older CFO are associated with lower credit risk 
levels.  When we restrict the sample to consider the joint effects of the governance 
variables, the results on board size are still maintained. 
My third essay investigates the important role of institutional investors in 
corporate governance and its impact on industrial firms’ credit risk during both crisis and 
non-crisis periods. I specifically focus on institutional investment horizons, trading 
activities and their ownership levels and examine how those factors affect a firm’s credit 
risk. I find that during the sample period of 2001-2011, higher institutional ownership is 
negatively related to five-year CDS spreads. This result is primarily driven by short-term 
institutional investors. Trading by short-term institutional investors also reduces a firm’s 
credit spread, implying that the firm’s creditors benefit from the improved information 
environment created by short-term institutions. On the other hand, long-term institutional 
ownership is positively related to a firm’s credit spread. Concentrated ownership of both 
types of institutional investors increases a firm’s risk level, consistent with conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and bondholders and the existence of private benefits 
enjoyed by blockholders at the expense of other stakeholders. However, during the 
financial crisis period from 2007 to 2008, higher ownership by long-term institutional 
investors is associated with lower credit risk of firms. Hence, long-term institutions play 
11 
 
an important role in enhancing financial stability during the crisis period by mitigating 
risk. These results are robust to estimation with endogenous institutional ownership. 
Chapters 2 to 4 correspond to my three essays. I conclude in Chapter 5.  
12 
 
Chapter 2: Default Risk and Corporate Governance in Financial vs. 
Non-Financial Firms 
 
This chapter will attempt to provide new evidence on the importance of various 
governance provisions from the perspective of bondholders, and will look at the 
predictive power and different impacts of various governance variables on credit spreads 
for financial firms and non-financial firms, respectively. Specifically, I test three basic 
hypotheses: 
a) Ho1:  default spreads should be the same for both non-financial and financial 
firms vs. 
      HA1: default spreads should differ by firm type: financial firms might have lower 
risk, on average due to beneficial regulatory provisions (such as deposit insurance, capital 
requirements or activity restrictions in banking industry) that cushion their risk relative to 
non-financial firms. Financial firms may also have lower risk to the extent that they are 
more adept at managing default risk due to their diversified portfolios of assets vs. non-
financial firms. On the other hand, bank regulations might increase risk-taking incentives 
(see, e.g., Merton 1977, Keeley, 1990). This chapter will compare the default risks across 
financial and non-financial firms.   
b) Ho2: governance factors do not affect default spreads for firms vs. 
HA2: governance factors have significant effects on default spreads. 
c) Ho3: governance factors have the same impact across financial and non-financial 
firms  vs. 
13 
 
HA3: governance variables relevant to financial firms may not be pertinent to non-
financial firms, and vice versa.  
My results show that financial firms indeed generally have lower credit default 
swap spreads, as well as lower standard deviation of spread than non-financial firms. I 
also find that while governance variables are comparable across firm types, the impact of 
these variables on the default spreads are significantly different for financial firms vs. 
non-financial firms. Board independence and financial transparency have a greater 
impact on financial firms than on non-financial firms. The firm’s ownership structure and 
takeover vulnerability are more important for non-financial firms than for financial firms. 
For non-financial firms, CEO ownership has a nonlinear relation with credit risk levels 
with an inflection point of around 40%. At ownership levels below (above) the inflection 
point, increased CEO ownership is associated with increased (decreased) credit risk. 
These results are consistent with both incentive alignment and entrenchment effects: at a 
low level of ownership, the interests of CEOs are more aligned to shareholders than 
bondholders; while at high level of ownership, the interests of CEOs are more aligned to 
bondholders than shareholders. For financial firms, CEO ownership is associated with 
lower default probability only when CEOs hold a large fraction of the firms’ shares. 
The remainder of this chapter is as follows.  The next section 2.1 provides a brief 
review of the extant literature on the impact of governance on default risk. Section 2.2 
outlines my hypotheses on how the selected governance variables affect default risk. 
Section 2.3 discusses the data.  The empirical results follow in Section 2.4.  This chapter 




2.1 Literature Review 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the separation between ownership and control and 
information asymmetries problems allow self-interested corporate insiders to transfer a 
firm’s resources to themselves at the expense of other stakeholders. Such behavior could 
impair a firm’s overall financial situation, leaving creditors, and not just shareholders 
vulnerable to losses. Governance mechanisms that are designed to reduce the 
manager/shareholder agency conflict and improve a firm’s information environment 
benefit both shareholders and bondholders. However, conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and bondholders will complicate the problem of identifying governance 
variables that serve both.  For levered firms, such conflicts include but are not limited to 
the mentioned risk shifting/asset substitution problem, debt overhang, restructuring risk 
and dividend payment policy discussed in Chapter 1. This chapter also looks at the equity 
ownership structure of a firm, especially focuses insiders’ ownership as it determines 
insiders’ incentive and power to make decisions within a corporation.  
Higher ownership by corporate insiders can align their interests to those of outside 
shareholders. However, high ownership could also entrench insiders, allowing them 
pursue personal benefits and job security without fear of reprisal at the expense of other 
stakeholders. From the perspective of creditors, increase in ownership makes a manager’s 
interests more aligned with those of shareholders and encourages risk taking, as long as a 
manager’s increased wealth investment in the firm is not so large as to make them 
increasingly sensitive to the firm’s non-systematic risk. As a manager’s non-human 
wealth investment and/or non-diversifiable firm specific human capital is large enough, 
their level of risk averseness will be reflected in more conservative investment policies 
15 
 
that are detrimental to shareholders, yet beneficial to bondholders. Higher ownership by 
outside shareholders, in contrast, could give shareholders power to monitor corporate 
insiders and influence their decisions in order to limit entrenchment effects and 
encourage risk-taking. The current literature shows mixed and conflicting results on the 
effects of insiders’ ownership on creditors. Baganani, Milonas, Saunders and Travlos 
(1994) show a non-linear relation between managerial ownership and bond returns. 
Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2002) show a negative relation between managerial 
ownership and yield spreads for a panel of 278 industrial firms from 1993 to 1998, 
implying that CEO equity holdings serve to alleviate managerial shirking and 
opportunism. Ortiz-Molina (2006) shows that CEO stock and option ownership is 
positively related to at-issue yield spread, and this relation is weaker at higher levels of 
ownership.
9
 Kim and Lu (2011) show when external governance is weak, CEO 
ownership is concavely related to the firm’s risk taking, meaning that both incentive 
alignment and entrenchment effects are present.
10
  
In sum, governance provisions favoring shareholders that mitigate information 
asymmetry between corporate insiders and investors, and constrain managerial 
opportunistic behavior could also benefit creditors, but also strong shareholder rights can 
cause risk substitution problem due to the agency cost of debt, which destroys bondholder 
wealth. While strong manager rights or weak shareholder rights could better avoid 
                                                             
9 This paper uses a sample of new debt issues from 1993 to 2000 and use both stock ownership and stock 
option to measure a CEO’s incentive. The results show an increasing and concave relation between 
managerial incentives and yield spreads, and this concavity is driven primarily by managerial stock 
options holdings rather than stock ownership.  
10 Specifically, at lower level of CEO ownership, increasing CEO ownership aligns the CEO’s interest with 
those of shareholders, while high level of CEO ownership exacerbate the risk-reducing effect, and 




takeover or other forms of expropriation by outside shareholders, but also can entrench 
managers and facilitate managerial opportunism. In addition to the arguments about 
ownership structures, for creditors, it is really a trade-off between the managers’ 
opportunistic behavior and the shareholders possibility to expropriate bondholders.   
Much of the current literature on corporate governance and debtholder wealth 
focuses on either a governance index value, such as the G-index created by Gompers et al. 
(2003), or  on individual  governance indicators (e.g., Klock et al., 2005, Cremers et al., 
2007, Bhojraj et al., 2003). In this paper, I use a set of governance variables rather than 
one single ranking provided by commercial governance rating firms in order to eliminate 
the possibility of measurement errors. The results of Daines, Gow and Larcker (2010) 
indicate that there is a high degree of measurement error in the rating processes across 
different commercially available corporate governance rating firms. In addition, the 
rankings provided by those firms have no predictive ability of governance related 
outcomes such as accounting restatements, shareholder suits, operating performance, and 
stock returns as promised. Secondly, and more importantly, in assessing the individual 
corporate governance variables rather than a single governance ranking, I can see clearly 
not only how the individual governance variable can affect bond default risk, but also can 
test how these provisions substitute for or complement each other and their differential 
impacts on bond default risk.  
I use CDS spreads to measure the firm’s credit risk and hondholder wealth rather 
than the commonly used bond yield spreads, credit rating, or other measurements used in 
previous literature, based on the attractive features of CDS data mentioned in Chapter 1. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first article to examine a set of comprehensive 
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governance variables and their effects on bondholder risk for both financial and non-
financial firms, respectively, by using CDS data. I attempt to answer three main questions: 
a) Are CDS spreads lower for financial firms than for non-financial firms?  We might 
expect to answer this question in the affirmative: financial firms might have lower risk, 
on average due to beneficial regulatory provisions (such as default insurance, capital 
requirements, and activity restrictions) that cushion their risk relative to non-financial 
firms. They may also be more adept at managing default risk due to their diversified 
portfolios of loans vs. non-financial firms.  b) Do governance attributes affect CDS 
spreads? c) Do the governance variables have differential effects on financial vs. non-
financial firms? To address b) and c), I look at several governance variables that have 
been deemed as significant in the literature, including board structure, financial 
transparency, takeover vulnerability, and CEO power and ownership. 
 
2.2 Governance Attributes and Default Spreads 
2.2.1 Board structure variables: size, expertise, and independence 
 
The principal conclusions of Mace (1971) were that “directors serve as a source 
of advice and counsel, serve as some sort of discipline, and act in crisis situations”.  A 
board should monitor and provide oversight role on corporate insiders’ actions on behalf 
of stakeholders, for example, controlling the process by which top executives are hired, 
promoted, assessed, and if necessary, dismissed. More importantly, the board should 
provide critical resources to the firm, such as building networks and connections, and 
play a role in the setting of strategy or the selection of projects. Directors have a fiduciary 
duty to protect shareholders’ interests. As Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) 
mention, boards can become the center of attention when things go wrong. The directors 
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of Enron and Worldcom, in particular, were held liable for the fraud that occurred; Enron 
directors had to pay $168 million to investor plaintiffs, of which $13 million was out of 
pocket. Worldcom directors had to pay $36 million, of which $18 million was out of 
pocket. Directors’ reputations are likely to be important in the market for directorships. 
Fich and Shivdasani (2007) show that a firm’s outside directors see a significant drop in 
other board seats held. Holmstrom (1999) states that the reputational concerns cause the 
agents to shy away from risky projects. From this perspective, a firm’s board plays an 
important role in affecting firm’s credit risk. 
 Previous empirical studies show mixed results on the impact of board size on 
firm performance. From the agency theory perspective, a smaller board may be 
advantageous due to coordination and communication issues, director free rider problems, 
and internal conflicts (see, e.g., Jensen, 1993, and Eisenberg Sundern, and Wells, 1998). 
However, a relatively large board have benefits as well: The Resource dependency theory 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) states that a firm’s board of directors provides precious 
resources of human capital and social/relational capital. Therefore, large boards, 
especially those with diversified board members, are beneficial by providing beneficial 
diverse expertise (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989, Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Such 
expertise may be of greater value in distress states, when credit risk is paramount. I use 
the total number of directors on a board to measure board size and the fraction of 
directors with more than four directorships on other firms to measure the board expertise. 
I hypothesize that a larger board and board with greater expertise would diminish the 
likelihood of default, i.e. there is a negative relationship between board size and credit 
risk level, and between board expertise and credit risk levels. Board independence 
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reflects the board’s ability to provide independent monitoring and provide the oversight 
role of management actions in order to reduce managerial opportunism. A number of 
researchers have argued that outside directors bear a reputation cost if the performance is 
poor, which leads them to monitor management actions more carefully and may avoid 
risky projects. Thus the credit risk level would be lower with a more independent board. I 
use the fraction of outside directors (non-executive director) on a board, audit committee 
independency and nominating committee independency to measure board independence. 
 
2.2.2 Firm’s Financial Transparency  
 
Financial transparency can reduce the information asymmetry between outside 
capital providers and corporate insiders, as well as among outside investors, which will in 
turn reduce agency costs. Transparent and accurate financial reporting can better facilitate 
stakeholders to monitor insiders’ actions. For bondholders, a firm’s information 
environment is extremely important for them to assess the firm’s credit risk levels. Duffie 
and Lando (2001) show that firms with imperfect accounting information are associated 
with higher credit spreads. Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2004) show that auditor quality 
and tenure matter to bondholders as they impact a firm’s information environment. Yu 
(2005) demonstrates that a lack of accounting transparency could signal hidden bad news 
of the firm. Firms with higher disclosure rankings/higher perceived accounting 
transparency have lower levels of credit spreads. Therefore, a transparent information 
environment could reduce credit spread.  
I use audit committees independence as a proxy for financial transparency. The 
audit committee is an operating committee selected from members of a firm’s board of 
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directors. The major responsibilities of the audit committee include overseeing the 
financial reporting and disclosure process, overseeing hiring, performance and 
independence of the external auditors, overseeing regulatory compliance, monitoring the 
internal control process the internal audit, and discussing risk management policies and 
practices with management. Audit committee plays an important role in facilitating 
effective monitoring and limiting managers’ self-serving behavior or misreport firm 
performance. Independent audit committee reflects high level of monitoring or oversight 
role and is measured as a dummy variable that is equal to one if audit committee is 
comprised wholly of outside independent directors, and is equal to zero otherwise.  As an 
independent audit committee tends to improve financial transparency, reduce information 
asymmetry and discipline managers, I hypothesize that this variable is negatively related 
to the firm’s credit risk.  
 
2.2.3 Firm’s Takeover Vulnerability 
 
As discussed above, bondholders of firms that are more exposed to takeover are 
disadvantaged relative to their counterparts due to increased leverage that raises the 
probability of default and of an adverse reordering the claim priorities. This represents 
another type of expropriation of bond holders by shareholders. I use the E-index created 
by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) to measure a firm’s takeover vulnerability. The E-
index covers six provisions, including staggered boards, supermajority requirements for 
mergers, poison pills, golden parachute arrangements, limits to shareholder amendments 
of the by-laws, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments; each provision is 
allocated one point so the E-index ranges from score 0 to 6.  Higher scores represent 
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lower shareholder rights and in turn lower takeover vulnerability. I expect that firms with 
lower takeover vulnerability enjoy lower default probabilities, as reflected in lower credit 
default spreads.  
 
2.2.4 CEO Power and Ownership  
 
CEO power is measured by a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO also serves 
as the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. If the CEO is also the chairman of a 
board, I believe the CEO has more power to influence decision making and credit risk. I 
use CEO stock ownership instead of total ownership by corporate insiders since it is not 
subject to the bias arising by changes in the number of insiders through time (see, e.g., 
Kim and Lu, 2011). In addition, CEOs tend to have the most influence on decision 
making than other insiders. CEO stock ownership is therefore a preferable variable for 
measuring entrenchment vs. alignment effects of insiders and their risk-taking behavior. 
From the perspective of bondholders, an increase in ownership makes manager’s interest 
more aligned to those of shareholders and encourages risk taking, as long as a manager’s 
increased wealth investment in the firm is not so large as to make them increasingly 
sensitive to the firm’s non-systematic risk, i.e. incentive alignment effect. As manager’s 
non-human wealth investment and/or non-diversifiable firm specific human capital is 
large enough, their risk averse will be reflected in more conservative investment policies 
that are detrimental to shareholders, yet beneficial to bondholders. Therefore, 
entrenchment effect predicts a negative relation between CEO ownership and credit risk. 
Based on the argument, I expect a concave relation between CEO ownership and credit 
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risk. As in previous studies, I control for ownership by institutional investors when I 
analyse the impact of CEO ownership on a firm’s credit risk.  
In my tests of the impact of governance variables on credit spreads, I also control 
for several firm specific characteristics as well as market variables used in previous 
studies, including: firm size, leverage, profitability, book to market ratio, and return 
volatility. In addition, I use depth to control the liquidity of credit default swap market 
and control the firm’s bond rating.  
 
2.3 Data Description 
 
I separate financial firms and non-financial firms by their 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Firms with one-digit SIC code 6 are classified as 
financial firms, while other firms are classified as non-financial firms. The accounting 
and market data used in this study are obtained from three sources: Board Analyst, 
Markit Group and Bloomberg. Corporate governance data are extracted from the Board 
Analyst database, a division of the Corporate Library datasets, accessible from the 
Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) platform. The latter provides detailed data on 
board structure, director positions, committee assignments, compensation, audit fees, 
ownership structure and takeover defences for 1,500 to 3,000 U.S. companies since 2001. 
The data used in this chapter are from proxy years 2001 to 2006, which cover the fiscal 
years 2000 to 2005. Governance variables that are missing from the Board Analyst 
database are collected manually from the corresponding factors in the Corporate 
Governance quotient (CGQ) of Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS). I measure the 
takeover vulnerability by using the E-index created by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
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(2009), downloaded from the authors’ website. Since the E-index only cover the years 
2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 for my sample period, I use the lagged index value to fill out 
the remaining sample years.  
The daily CDS spread data are obtained from the Markit Group for the calendar 
years 2001 to 2006. I use the highly liquid five year maturity contracts on U.S. dollar-
dominated senior unsecured debt (SNRFOR) with modified restructuring (MR) for US 
based issuers. I take the average of daily spreads to obtain a yearly spread for my 
dependent variable. I also use the average of daily depths to measure the contract 
liquidity, and the average bond rating as an additional control variable. The governance 
and control variables are lagged by one year when I match CDS data. This setup 
mitigates endogeneity concerns due to reverse causality. My initial sample consists of 
11,751 firm-year observations. I delete observations if the five year CDS spread, depth, 
or rating data are missing. The control variables of market and accounting data are 
collected from Bloomberg. I merge the governance data and CDS data to obtain a sample 
of 2,359 firm-year observations for non-financial firms and 450 firm-year observations 
for financial firms without missing variables. Table 1 shows the detailed definition and 
data sources of the variables used.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel A-D of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables in my models 
for sample firms. It is apparent that financial firms generally have lower default swap 
spreads and lower standard deviation of spreads than non-financial firms. The means and 
median tests of differences confirm that both the mean and median of credit spreads of 
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non-financial firms are higher than those of financial firms. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that financial firms enjoy the benefits of regulatory provisions that limit their 
risk relative to that borne by non-financial firms.  They may also be more capable of 
managing default risk due to their greater diversification of assets. Panel D of Table 2 
further separates the financial institutions into five categories based on their 4-digit SIC 
codes: depository banking institutions, nondepository credit institutions, insurance 
companies, security & commodity brokers and holding & other investment offices. As 
the panel shows, depository banking institutions have the lowest mean, median and 
standard deviation of credit spreads while insurance companies have the highest spreads. 
Several governance variables are comparable between financial firms and non-financial 
firms. Some differences are observed, however. For example, CEO ownership for 
financial firms is higher than non-financial firms, while the average institutional 
ownership for non-financial firms is higher. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients matrix for non-financial firms 
and financial firms, respectively. For non-financial firms, bond rating, liquidity, size, and 
ROA are significantly negatively correlated with default spreads. Leverage and BM have 
positive and significant correlations with default spreads. Board size, the number of 
outside directors, independent compensation and nominating committees, have 
significant negative correlations with default spreads probability, consistent with my 
hypotheses. CEO power and ownership are significantly negatively and positively 
correlated with default spreads. On the other hand, institutional ownership and financial 
transparency are not significantly correlated with default spreads.  
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For financial firms, the control variables are significantly correlated with default 
risk with the expected signs. However, with the exception of board size, in sharp contrast 
to the results for non-financial firms, the governance variables are not significantly 
correlated to default spreads. In the next section, I will formally test the relationships 
between governance variables and default spreads. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
2.4 Empirical Results 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results for models that relate the firm’s default 
spread to the governance variables and the control variables.  The models allow for both 
fixed firm and year effects.
 11
 
              ∑                                                      
                                                                                                                                         (1) 
 
A firm’s governance variables and control variables are lagged one year relative 
to its CDS spread.    are the time-invariant firm-fixed effects,     are the year fixed effect, 
       is the regression residual.  
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
I note that with the exception of the book to market ratio, the control variables 
that are significant are not common to both non-financial firms and financial firms. For 
                                                             
11  When I add industry dummy variables based on two-digit SIC code for non-financial firms. Both the 
sign and scale of the coefficient of my testing governance variables remain quite similar so my results 
and conclusion do not change. For example, for Model (3), the coefficient of BDEXP with industry 
dummies included is -1.11**, compared with -1.06** without industry dummies; the coefficient of 
E_value is -0.44*** with industrial dummies, compared with -0.42*** without industrial dummies. Here 
I only report the results without industrial dummies included. 
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non-financial firms, firm size is positively correlated with default spreads, suggesting that 
larger firms are more likely to take on riskier projects. Lower ROA, higher book to 
market ratio, and higher stock return volatility are associated with higher default spreads. 
Similarly, the governance variables that affect default spreads differ between non-
financial firms and financial firms. For non-financial firms, Model 1 shows that greater 
board expertise, compensation committee independency and effective takeover defence, 
represented by high E_value, can significantly decrease the next year’s default spreads. 
Model 3 shows that board expertise and effective takeover defence effect remain robust 
even after considering a firm’s ownership structure. This result implies that for non-
financial firms, board expertise is valuable, especially for bondholders. In addition, these 
results imply that bondholders are concerned with takeover risk as takeover defence 
provisions can significantly predict lower default probability. On the other hand, for 
financial firms, Model 1 shows that default probability is negatively related to board size, 
the size of the outside director contingent, and the quality of the firm’s financial 
transparency. The outside board directors and financial transparency variables remain 
important in Model 3, when the ownership structure is considered.   
We can see from Model 2 for non-financial firms, CEO power, as proxied by the 
inverse of dumsep, is inversely related with default probability. Thus, while CEO power 
might be not beneficial to shareholders, it reduces the risks to bond holders. There is a 
concave relation between CEO ownership and default risk, as indicated by the positive 
and negative coefficients on the stand-alone and squared terms, respectively, which is 
consistent with both incentive alignment effects and entrenchment effects as levels of 
CEO ownership increase. At a low level of CEO ownership, default risk increases with 
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CEO ownership. At a higher level of ownership, the default probability is a decreasing 
function of CEO ownership, with an inflection point at about 40 % based on my sample. 
This result is consistent with Bagnani, Milonas, Saunders, and Travlos (1994), who also 
show such nonlinear effects of managerial ownership and bondholder wealth where 
bondholder wealth is measured by bond return. Kim and Lu (2011) indirectly support my 
results, showing that there is a concave relation between CEO ownership and a firm’s 
risk level, although they use R&D expenditure as a proxy for firms’ risk. Specifically, 
they show that at a low level of CEO ownership, CEO incentives are more aligned with 
those of shareholders and they invest more in risky projects; when their ownership of the 
firm is relatively high, they tend to invest more conservatively due to their growing 
concern of non-systematic risk and their job security, so their incentives are more aligned 
with that of bondholders. For financial firms, CEO ownership is negatively related to 
default probability only when a CEO has a large fraction of shares.  
To summarize, the results show that for non-financial firms, board expertise, 
firm’s takeover vulnerability, institutional ownership, CEO power and ownership are the 
key determinants of default probabilities. For financial firms, however, board 
independency and financial transparency are the paramount factors that decide the debt 
default spread, with weak evidence of CEOs who avoid risky projects when they have 
concentrated ownership in the firm.  
To further shed light on how CEO ownership affects default risk, I look at how a 
CEO affects the company’s net cash position, reflected in its net cash ratio. The net cash 
ratio is defined as the cash and near cash item divided by net assets, where net assets is 
the total assets less cash and near cash item. While I use lagged values of governance 
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variables to predict the next year’s default spreads, the net cash ratio and CEO ownership 
are examined contemporaneously. Table 5 presents the results.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
As shown in Table 5, CEO ownership has a nonlinear relation with the net cash ratio. 
When CEO ownership represents less than 40% of the firm’s total shares outstanding, net 
cash flow is a decreasing function of ownership, implying that CEOs will be less likely to 
behave in an opportunistic manner, as such behavior will be detected more easily at low 
net cash levels. In other words, CEO incentives are more aligned with those of 




2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter explores the direct impact of various corporate governance 
attributes that are deemed important to shareholders on the credit risk of financial and 
non-financial firms in the U.S. The results show that both the risk levels as well as the 
factors affecting risk differ considerably between financial firms and non-financial firms. 
This result may reflect structural factors, such as regulatory provisions (such as default 
insurance) that limit the riskiness of financial firms relative to non-financial firms.  
Financial firms may also provide lower risk for bondholders to the extent that they are 
more adept at managing default risk due to their diversified portfolios of assets vs. non-
financial firms. More independent boards and a high level of financial transparency are 
associated with lower default probability for financial firms only. For non-financial firms, 
greater board expertise, and lower takeover exposure are associated with lower bond 
                                                             
12 These results are robust when I also control for other CEO characteristics including age and tenure. 
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default probability. CEO ownership has a concave impact on bond default probability, 
showing both incentive alignment and entrenchment effects exist as CEO ownership 
increases, with an inflection point at 40% based on my sample. Topics for future work 
include exploring the time varying nature of bond default risk and of the governance 
mechanisms that affect such risk, with particular attention to the role of the underlying 
state of the economy. The latter does seem to matter for shareholder risk, as we note that 
over the Great Recession (January 2007-December 2009), the U.S. Financial Sector 
Equity Index fared considerably worse (falling by 51.9%) than the Industrial Sector, 
proxied by the DJIA (which fell by 35.9%). The next chapter focuses on U.S. banking 
firms and explores their default probabilities.  
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Chapter 3: Default Risk Estimation, Bank Credit Risk, and Corporate 
Governance 
 
Credit risk of banks is recognized as a key feature of the liquidity panic in the U.S. 
financial system and the global financial crisis of 2008.  This risk has been attributed to 
poor governance practices, although very few studies have actually tried to measure the 
impact of governance on credit risk for financial firms directly. This chapter examines the 
value of corporate governance from the creditors’ respective rather than from 
shareholders’ perspective.  In particular, I provide new evidence on the impact of 
governance structures on the credit risk of a panel of U.S. banks as viewed by creditors. 
Recent studies looking at governance effects on financial firms have looked at how 
shareholders returns are affected by risk indicators, as in Aebi, Sabato,and Schmid (2012) 
or on the behavior of the risk indicators - e.g. Laeven and Levine (2009). My approach 
differs from that of Aebi, Sabat, and Schmid (2012) who also look at risk indirectly, in 
that I look at how governance affects the probability of default through time. I also differ 
from Laeven and Levine (2012), in that I consider explicitly the probability of default for 
a fairly large sample of U.S. banks.
13
 
In addition to providing new estimates of the default probabilities of banks, I also 
consider the impact on default risk of several corporate governance mechanisms that have 
been deemed in the literature to be beneficial to shareholders. However, to the extent that 
these mechanisms hamper the interests of debt holders, the “extra” costs of corporate debt 
financing may be detrimental to shareholder value ex post. Such costs may in part explain 
                                                             
13   Laeven and Levene (2012) study risk effects in an indirect manner, as reflected by various indicators, as 
they are affected by corporate governance variables.  They use an international sample that includes only 
10 U.S. banks. 
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why there are mixed results on most empirical papers that measure governance 
mechanisms on  performance as measured by stock prices, or accounting indicators. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) devise a trading strategy that longs (shorts) firms 
with strong (weak) governance characteristics that generates abnormal returns of 8.5% 
per year during the 1990’s for sample firms. In contrast, Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu 
(2009) suggest that these results are caused by industry clustering, and that governance 
per se does not add value.  Cunat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) provide evidence that 
corporate governance provisions contained in shareholder votes that are decided by small 
margins do affect the stock market value of S&P500 firms. They do not consider the 
effects of such votes on bondholders. Since my study separates the effects of corporate 
governance indicators on both shareholders and bondholders, I can explain clearly why 
some shareholder favorable governance provisions turn out to be ineffective. My analysis 
is conducted on a panel of U.S. banks, including commercial banks and savings banks. 
The results should be of considerable interest to researchers, practitioners and policy 
makers. 
As the banks in my sample with governance variables do not contain sufficient 
CDS information but have sufficient accounting and financial information, I therefore 
choose a credit risk model to estimate the default probability of those banks through time. 
Currently, two main approaches to modeling default probability are used as benchmarks 
in the literature: reduced-form models of credit risk and structural models of credit risk. 
The reduced-form approach does not provide an explicit link between default and the 
structure of the firm. As such, it is of little use in establishing the role of governance 
variables or other variables internal to the firm on credit risk (e.g. Duffie and Singleton, 
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1999). In contrast, the structural credit approach provides an intuitive picture, as well as 
an endogenous explanation for default. It generates default probabilities from accounting 
and financial information, and thus can be used to provide and update credit information 
in a timely manner, based on information with respect to different firms’ financial 
constraints, and governance policies. Merton’s (1974) seminal structural model is a 
starting point in the credit risk modeling literature. Merton model preserves all the 
essential property of the structural model and the analytical expression for the firm’s 
equity value can be mapped in a straightforward and parsimonious manner into the 
implied asset value and asset volatility through time.  In addition, other structural models 
can be nested into the algorithm to predict the forward default probabilities. Black and 
Cox (1976), Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein 
(2001), Zhou (2001) and Huang and Huang (2003) provide alternative approaches to that 
adopted herein. In this chapter, I choose structural credit approach to estimate sample 
banks’ default probabilities, following Merton type structural model. 
 
3.1 The Credit Risk Model 
 
Following Merton (1974), I assume that the underlying asset valuation follows a 
geometric Brownian motion process: 
  
 
           (1) 
  
where    is the mean rate of return on firm asset;    denotes asset volatility; and    is 
the increment of a standard Brownian motion. The drift will be replaced by the risk free 
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rate, r, under the risk neutral world.
14
 The exogenous default boundary is denoted by  . 
Conditional on time zero, the default event occurs when the asset value hits or falls below 
the default boundary for the first time. Upon default, I assume the firm liquidates 
immediately with assets dispersed in accordance with the Absolute Priority Rule (APR). 
The cumulative first passage default probability of a firm going bankrupt over the period 
(0, T) is given by:
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 (   )  is the cumulative probability from time 0 to time T.  ( )  is the cumulative 
probability of a standard normal distribution. There are several ways to define the 
exogenous default boundary K. Merton (1974) uses the face value of the debt as a default 
trigger and sets     .  KMV                 defines a firm’s exogenous default 
boundary as the book value of its short-term debt plus one-half of its long-term debt, 
arguing that the firm will always have to service short-term debt, but can be more flexible 
in servicing the long-term debt. 
16
  Since the firm’s equity can be viewed as a call option 
on its assets under the structural model, the expected value of equity is an increasing 
                                                             
14 I also use the change of current book value of asset and previous book value of asset divided by previous 
book value of asset to measure    . The major regression results by using this alternative default 
probability are qualitatively similar and therefore not reported. For example, the coefficient of ln board 
size is -0.0495 and is significant at 0.001 level with an adjusted R-square at 0.109. 
15 See Black and Cox (1976) and Leland and Toft (1996) for more details.  
16 The firm KMV is named after Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek, the founders of the company in 2002. 
It has since been sold to Moody’s.  It produces commercially acceptable credit methods.  
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function of maturity. Thus, the pressure to liquidate emanates from the firm’s short-term 
liabilities, especially short-term debt. I use this measurement of exogenous default 
boundary as it is considered to be relatively more realistic. As the asset is non-tradable its 
price cannot be observed in marketplace. I use the algorithm developed by Ronn and 
Verma (1986), based on Black-Sholes (1973) option pricing framework, to compute the 
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(5) 
The equity price and volatility are denoted by   and   , respectively. Equations (3) and 
(5) show this relationship as inspired by Black and Scholes (1973). Equation (4) restricts 
the relationship between the equity volatility and asset volatility and can be derived by 
Ito’s lemma. As equity prices are observed in the market and the corresponding equity 
volatility can be calculated by the high-frequency daily equity price data, the asset value 
  and asset volatility    can be computed by solving these two non-linear equations 
simultaneously given the exogenous default boundary   and maturity   in year. I use the 
                                                             
17  Brockman and Turtle (2003) provides alternative approach that views equity as a down-and-out call 
option (DOC) instead of a standard European call option. Here I use Black-Sholes and Merton type 
model. It  provides computational simplicity. 
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five-year cumulative default probabilities estimated by the above structural models as 
proxies for the credit risk levels. 
 
3.2 Corporate Governance Hypotheses  
 
 
Due to the conflicts of interest of shareholders and bondholders mentioned in 
Chapter 1, I expect that default risk will be higher for firms with corporate governance 
mechanisms in place that are designed to maximize shareholder wealth at the expense of 
creditors, due to the increased indirect cost of debt and direct bankruptcy costs. In 
addition, since managerial opportunistic behaviors or moral hazard problem could impair 
a firm’s overall financial situation, leaving creditors vulnerable to losses, I expect that 
corporate governance mechanisms that are designed to resolve moral hazard problem and 
reduce managerial opportunistic behaviors will benefit both bondholders, and 
shareholders, which will increase the firms’ value and lower their default risk.  
Governance mechanisms that induce large shareholders such as institutional investors to 
monitor management rather than to secure their own benefits at the expense of other 
investors will have similar effects, while this effect depends on the trade-off of the 
institutional investors' independent monitoring role and the wealth transfer effect. I 
choose several widely used proxies for governance quality based on previous literature 
and Chapter 2 of my dissertation: board size, board independence, separation between 
CEO and Chairman, Institutional Ownership, Insider holdings by top management and 
directors to examine their effect on banks’ default probabilities.18  
                                                             
18 Fama and Jensen (1983), Yermack(1996), Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997), Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998), Denis and Sarin (1999), Davis (1999), Ryan and Wiggins (2004), Laeven 
and Lavine (2012), and Aebei, Sabato, and Schmid (2012). 
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Hypothesis 1: The board size of a bank is negatively related to its default probability. 
In this Chapter I especially test the impact of board size on banks’ credit risk 
levels based on credit risk models. Chapter 2 shows no (negative) significant relation 
between board size and financial firms’ CDS spreads when the firms’ ownership structure 
is considered (not considered). Here, I separate commercial banks and savings banks 
from all the financial firms examined in Chapter 2, and test the impact of board size of a 
bank and its default probability.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of the independent outsiders on the board is negatively 
related to the bank’s credit risk. 
I propose that board independence reflects the board’s ability to provide 
independent monitoring and oversight role of management actions so as to reduce moral 
hazard problem and lead to better firm overall performance, which could benefit all 
stakeholders including bondholders. In addition, due to fiduciary responsibility and 
reputation and career concern, a firm’s independent directors pay more attention to 
prevent a firm from stress state and default event, which leads them to monitor 
management actions more carefully and may avoid risky projects.. Previous studies show 
mixed results concerning the impact of board independence and the firm’s stock market 
performance. The impact of these variables on credit risk has been largely ignored. 
Chapter 2 shows that board independence is significantly negatively related to financial 
firms’ credit risk measured by CDS spreads. Here I check whether this factor is robust 
and is still significantly negatively related to banks’ default probability by using 
alternative measurement of default probability by credit risk model. 
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In addition, I also test whether board other characteristics, such as CEO age, CFO 
age, and the proportion of busy directors who are active CEOs of other firms, on a firm’s 
default risk.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of institutional ownership on the credit risk level of banks 
depends on the trade-off between the institution’s independent monitoring role, and its 
power to redistribute wealth. 
Institutional investors can play an important monitoring role to reduce managerial 
opportunistic behavior and agency conflicts between management and stakeholders, 
which would benefit bondholders as well, resulting in lower default risk. We call this 
phenomenon the shared benefit hypothesis. On the other hand, institutional investors, 
especially institutional blockholders who are less subject to free-rider issues than small 
shareholders (Gossman and Hart, 1980, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), may cause severe 
agency costs of debt, consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis, whereby institutions 
facilitate a transfer from bondholders to shareholders, which increases the agency cost of 
debt. Therefore, wealth transfer hypothesis implies that institutional blockholders or 
activisms are detrimental to bondholders. Chapter 4 focuses on the governance role 
played by institutional investors on a firm’s credit risk. Chapter 2 finds no significant 
relation between institutional ownership and financial firm’s credit risk, although it 
indeed finds a negative relation between institutional ownership and non-financial firm’s 
credit risk. In this chapter, I re-examine the impact of institutional ownership on banks’ 
default probability, and propose that the expected impact of institutional ownership on 
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bank’s credit risk level depends on the trade-off between the shared benefit and wealth 
transfer hypothesis two effects.   
Hypotheses 1-3 are tested using statistical regressions, controlling for several firm 
specific characteristics as well as market variables including:  
a) Leverage: leverage is measured here as the total book value of debt divided by 
the total book value of assets. Intuitively, the leverage ratio is expected to be positively 
correlated with a bank’s credit risk level.  
b) Profitability: I use return on asset to control for the profitability of the banks. 
This variable is expected to be inversely related to the bank’s credit risk.  
c) Market-to-book ratio: the market-to-book ratio is measured as the market price 
divided by the book value of equity per share. This variable is commonly used to capture 
the firm’s growth opportunities.  I hypothesize that credit risk should be lower for firms 
with lower market to book ratios, consistent with the view that safety is associated with 
value and not growth in times of financial instability. 
 
3.3 Data Description  
 
I start with all the US banks as classified as commercial banks (SIC: 6020), 
federally chartered saving banks (SIC: 6035) and non-federally chartered saving banks 
(SIC: 6036) from Compustat during the period 2001-2010. The corporate governance 
data are extracted from the Corporate Library dataset on the Wharton Research Data 
Service (WRDS) platform during the period from 2001 to 2007, just prior to the 2008-09 
financial crisis. The Corporate Library contains the corporate governance information 
worldwide collected by GMI (Governance metric international) rating which is the 
leading independent provider of global corporate governance and ESG ratings. The 
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governance variables include: Sep dummy - equals one if CEO and Chairman are separate 
individuals; Board size is the total number of directors on a given board; Board 
Independence is computed as the number of outside and outside-related directors divided 
by the board size; Institutional Holding is the percent of outstanding shares held by 
institutions; Insider Holding is the estimated as percentage of outstanding shares held by 
top management and directors, and the estimated percentage of shares held by 5% or 
greater shareholders, as reported in the company’s most recent proxy statement; Director 
active CEOs is the percent of the sum of directors who are active CEOs of public or 
private companies on a given board. Accounting and market data including the short-term 
debt, long-term debt and equity prices are extracted from COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
respectively. The risk free rate is proxied by the rate paid by the fixed-rate payer on an 
interest rate swap with 1-year maturity which is available in the Federal Reserve H.15 
database. The governance and control variables are lagged by one year when I match 
CDS data. This setup mitigates endogeneity concerns due to reverse causality. Matching 
the data sources provides me with a sample that consists of a panel of 228 banks with 782 
observations. Table 6 provides some descriptive statistics for this sample.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Panel A of Table 6 reports distributional statistics of the key accounting variables. 
The largest cohort consists of commercial banks. Such banks are on average about three-
times the size of the savings banks. While commercial banks issue more short-term and 
long-term debt than savings banks, their leverage ratios are lower. Commercial banks are 
somewhat more profitable than savings banks, based on their return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE).  The high standard deviation of total asset indicates that the size 
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of both commercial banks and saving banks varies dramatically across observations; high 
positive skewness shows that the majority of the banks in the sample are very large in 
size. 
Panel B of Table 6 shows the distributional characteristics of the governance 
variables. As shown therein, the average board size consists of about 13 members; 
commercial bank directors tend to be “busier” than the savings bank directors as reflected 
by their service as CEO’s of other firms. Commercial banks are somewhat more likely to 
have CEO/Chairman duality. Commercial banks ownership is more dispersed than that of 
savings banks, as indicated by their lower institutional holding and insider holding ratios. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
As is shown in Table 7 and Figure 1, there is considerable time variation in the 
estimated cumulative default probabilities.  On the whole, commercial banks are riskier 
than their savings bank cohorts for years 2008 and 2009. Both commercial banks and 
savings banks experience a significant increase in risk in the year prior to the 2008-09 
financial crisis. My results indicate that simple structural model functions well to predict 
the trends of default probabilities of banks. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Figures 1 illustrates the dynamics of the cumulative default probabilities for the banks in 
my sample.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
41 
 
Table 8 shows results of the estimation of equation 5 which relates the default 
probabilities to the accounting/market control variables as well as the corporate 
governance indicators: 
              ∑    
 
         ∑    
 
                        (6) 
 
where           is the estimated default probabilities for bank i at time t;      and      are 
the firm specific accounting/market variables and  governance indicators respectively. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
As is shown in Table 8A, banks with higher market to book ratios are associated 
with lower default probabilities, ceteris paribus.  Small banks, banks with higher leverage, 
and banks with lower ROAs are more likely to default. Corporate governance 
mechanisms have larger effects on commercial banks than on savings banks. Given 
restrictions on data availability, I first perform the regressions using the governance 
variables sequentially.   
We can see that as board size is significantly negatively related to bank credit risk 
levels. Hypothesis 1 is well supported. These results are consistent with Chaganti, 
Mahajan, and Sharma (1985), who find that non-failed companies tended to have larger 
boards; smaller boards are associated with a higher rate of bankruptcy. Our results are 
also consistent with Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012), where board size is positively 
related to banks’ performance, measured by stock returns, ROA and ROE. My results 
support the resource dependency theory, suggesting that large board could provide 
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valuable expertise, access to more resources through the social and relational ties of 
board members, high quality advice, which could help to lower banks’ credit risk levels.  
For commercial banks, as shown in Table 8B, greater board independence is 
associated with lower bank credit risk. A 1% increase in board independence from its 
mean (0.84) is associated with a decrease in default probability of 0.059 percentage point. 
This constitutes an economically meaningful result, given the range of average default 
probabilities of 0.009% to 0.071% during the period 2001 to 2007. The result implies that 
independent boards confer higher survival probabilities to banks. For the full sample, 
although the coefficient of Board Independence is not significant, the sign of the 
coefficient is negative, as expected. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is only partially supported for the 
commercial banks in my sample. These results are consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, and LaFond (2006) that board independence is positively related to credit ratings. 
My results are consistent with Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma (1985) for savings 
institutions.  
For commercial banks, we can see from Panel B of Table 8 that the coefficient for 
Institutional Holdings variable is 0.05. This implies that a 1% increase in the holding by 
an institutional from its mean (0.43) is associated with a .0215 percentage point increase 
in the default probability. The result implies that institutional investors could make bank 
default probability even higher during normal period. There might be two reasons to 
explain this result. First, institutional investors may influence management to invest in 
riskier projects due to the limited liability and convex payoff to equity holders. Second, a 
large equity position provides institutional investors the incentive and power to extract 
corporate resources for their own benefits, private benefits, at the expense of interests of 
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minority shareholders and creditors. In the next Chapter, I will examine the impact of 
institutional governance on firm’s credit risk in more details, with special focuses on 
institutional investment horizon and their ownership levels. Hypothesis 3 is supported 
only for the commercial banks of the sample. These results are consistent with Aebi, 
Sabato, and Schmid (2012), who show that institutional holdings are negatively related to 
bank performance during the crisis.    
Although institutional holdings can impact the credit risk levels of commercial 
banks, the impact of ownership by banks’ insiders on banks credit risk levels is unclear 
for my sample, based on the coefficient of Insider Holding. For other board 
characteristics, I find that busy directors, as reflected by their service as CEOs of public 
or private companies, are associated with higher credit risk levels. In addition, while CEO 
age does not have impact on default probabilities CFO age has a significant effect. We 
can see that older CFOs have ability to control banks’ risk levels more than junior CFOs 
do, as shown the negative significant relation between CFO age and the bank’s default 
probability.  
The governance variables are not significant for the savings banks, as is shown in 
Table 8C. I also performed the analysis for a smaller sample of all the banks with 
necessary data to allow for the joint consideration of the governance variables. In this 
regression of the full sample, the board size and busy director effects are sustained, along 





3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter explores the impacts of corporate governance structures on credit 
risk levels of banks in the U.S. The results show that estimated five year default 
probabilities of U.S. banks are time varying and took a significant jump in the year prior 
to the financial crisis of 2008-9. The results show that banks with higher market to book 
ratios are associated with higher default probabilities. In addition, small banks, banks 
with higher leverage and lower ROA are more likely to default. Corporate governance 
mechanisms affect commercial banks more than savings institutions in US. The risk 
taking behaviors of U.S. banks are affected by several governance structure variables, 
including: board size, board independence, institutional ownership, as well as the age of 
CFO and whether directors serving other firms as CEOs. I provide evidence that, after 
controlling firm specific characteristics, commercial banks with larger and more 
independent boards are associated with significantly lower credit risk levels.  These 
results are consistent with previous chapter on the sample of financial firm. In addition, 
the results also show that lower ownership by institutional investors and older CFOs are 
associated with significantly lower credit risk levels, implying that experienced CFO are 
beneficial. For the full sample including both commercial and savings banks, larger board 
size, older CFO and less busy directors are associated with lower credit risk levels, also 
economically and statistically significant.  When we restrict the sample to allow for 
consideration the joint effects of the governance variables, the results on board size and 
busy directors are maintained. In the next Chapter, I specifically examine the impact of 
institutional governance on industrial firm’s credit risk. 
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Chapter 4: Institutional Investment Horizon, the Information 
Environment and Firm Credit Risk 
 
In this chapter, I specifically look at the important role played by institutional 
stockholders (hereafter referred to as institutional investors in this chapter) in corporate 
governance and the relation between institutional governance and firm credit risk. Over 
the past six decades, institutional investors have grown to represent the most influential 
class of capital providers to the U.S. markets.
19
 As important sources of external finance, 
such investors, especially those with large stock ownership stakes, have both the 
incentives and the ability to play an active role in monitoring, information-gathering, and 
intervening in portfolio firms’ investment and financing decisions. Institutional investors 
also actively collect information of portfolio firms and trade based on private information, 
which can improve a firm’s informational environment, and reduce information 
asymmetry between the firm’s insiders and outside capital providers (see, e.g. Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986, Porter, 1992, Maug, 1998, Gillan and Starkes, 2000, Chen, Harford, 
and Li, 2007, Yan and Zhang, 2009, Edmans, 2009 and Michaely and Vincent, 2012). 
Much the extant literature on the role of institutions in corporate governance focuses on 
institutional investors’ impact on shareholders, notwithstanding the importance of debt 
financing for firms in the U.S. market. Studies that do look at how institutional investors 
affect bondholders usually treat such investors as a homogenous group without 
differentiating them by their investment horizon (see, e.g., Bhojaraj and Sengupta, 2003, 
                                                             
19   In 1950, the aggregate equity held by institutions amounted to $8.7 billion or about 6.1% of total 
outstanding equity in the US. By the end of 2009, total institutional equity holdings grew to $10,238.7 
billion, somewhat more than 50% of total outstanding equity (Conference Board (2010)). 
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Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond, 2006, Cremers, Nair and Wei, 2007, Switzer and 
Wang, 2013). The main objective of this paper is to provide new evidence on this score.  
Bushee (2004) asserts that the common approach to classifying institutions by 
their legal types (e.g. bank trusts, insurance companies, pension funds, independent 
advisers) has a key disadvantage in that there is tremendous variation within categories 
with respect to investment horizons and sensitivity to short-term news. Porter (1992) 
notes that pension funds and some other institutional investors are typically assumed to 
be ideal long-term investors. However, many institutions, especially pension funds, trade 
actively. Recent work confirms the importance of investment horizon as it affects 
monitoring, the information environment, investment and financing decisions, and firm 
performance (see e.g. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), Chen, Harford and Li, 2007, 
Yan and Zhang, 2009, Marchica, 2011, Chang Chen and Dasgupta, 2012, Aghion, 
Reenen and Zingales, 2013). 
Institutional investors can play an important monitoring role to reduce managerial 
opportunistic behavior and agency conflicts between management and stakeholders, 
which would benefit bondholders as well, resulting in lower CDS spreads. We call this 
phenomenon the shared benefit hypothesis. On the other hand, institutional investors, 
especially institutional blockholders who are less subject to free-rider issues than small 
shareholders (Gossman and Hart, 1980, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), may cause severe 
agency costs of debt due to risk shifting or asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
debt overhang (Myers, 1977), adverse payout policies, and takeover or restructuring risk 
(e.g. Parrino, 1997, Bhojaraj and Sengupta, 2003, Cremers, Nair and Wei, 2007, Klein 
and Zur, 2011). These phenomena are consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis, 
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whereby institutions facilitate a transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders, 
which increases the agency cost of debt. In addition, outside blockholders may enjoy 
private benefit through their market power and voting blocks at the expense of the 
interests of minority shareholders and bondholders. Therefore, private benefit hypothesis 
and wealth transfer hypothesis imply that institutional blockholders or activisms are 
detrimental to bondholders.  
Since the seminal work of Merton (1974), many structural credit risk models price 
corporate debt as contingent claims over the asset value of the issuing firm. In practice, 
however, it is difficult for investors in the secondary credit market to observe a firm’s 
assets directly, so they have to infer an issuer’s credit quality from the available 
accounting data and other publicly available information. Therefore, a firm’s information 
environment affects its credit spreads (Duffie and Lando, 2001, Maxwell and Miller, 
2004, Yu, 2005). From this perspective, institutional trading can improve the firm’s 
information environment, and in turn affect its credit risk. Michaely and Vincent (2012) 
assert that the role of institutions in reducing asymmetric information is paramount.  
In this chapter, I add richness to the tests of the effects of institutional investors in 
reducing information asymmetries, and shedding new light on the shared benefit vs. 
wealth transfer and private benefit hypotheses. I classify institutional investors based on 
their observed trading behavior and provide direct tests of the impact of institutional 
stock holdings and investment horizons on firms’ credit risk levels during normal and 
crisis periods. i also look at how the participants in the CDS market identify this 
information from the stock market. My results show that the factors of investment 
horizon, as well as ownership level and ownership concentration can significantly affect 
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CDS pricing.  Specifically, I find that during the sample period of 2001-2011, higher 
institutional ownership is negatively related to five-year CDS spreads. This result is 
primarily driven by short-term institutional investors. Trading by short-term institutional 
investors also reduces firms’ credit spreads, which indicates that firms’ bondholders 
benefit from the improved information environment created by short-term institutions. 
On the other hand, long-term institutional ownership is positively related to a firm’s 
credit risk. Concentrated ownership of both types of institutional investors increases a 
firm’s risk level, consistent with conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
bondholders and the existence of the private benefit enjoyed by outside blockholders. 
However, during the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2008, higher ownership by firms’ 
long-term institutional investors is associated with reduced credit risk. Hence, long-term 
institutions play an important role in enhancing financial stability during the crisis period 
by mitigating risk. These results are robust to estimation with endogenous institutional 
ownership. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section, I 
provide an outline of the hypotheses.  In section 4.2 I describe the data and methodology. 
Section 4.3 presents the results of the analyses. The chapter concludes with a summary in 
section 4.4. 
 
4.1 Development of Hypotheses 
4.1.1 Short-term Institutional Investors and Credit Risk 
 
 
The information environment is extremely important for bondholders for 
assessing firms’ credit risk levels. Duffie and Lando (2001) argue that credit spreads are 
higher in circumstances where investors must rely on imperfect accounting information 
about asset values. Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2004) show that auditor quality and 
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tenure matter to bondholders as they impact a firm’s information environment. Yu (2005) 
demonstrates that a lack of accounting transparency could signal hidden bad news of the 
firm. Firms with higher disclosure rankings/higher perceived accounting transparency 
have lower levels of credit spreads. Institutional investors have the incentive to collect 
information about the firm because of the high stakes under risk. In addition, due to 
economies of scale, institutions have a smaller cost of information gathering than 
individual investors. Institutional trading based on private information, as well as 
monitoring via “exit”, will improve a firm’s information environment, which will benefit 
all the outside investors including bondholders. How does the institutional investment 
horizon affect the quality of information concerning the firm? Edmans (2009) asserts that 
short-term institutional investors are beneficial. Their ability to sell improves the 
information embedded into prices and creates a more transparent information 
environment via the “Wall Street Walk”. Yan and Zhang (2009) show that short-term 
trading predicts future stock returns, reflecting such an informational advantage. Long-
term institutions, neither have the ability to predict short-term returns, nor do they have 
superior long-term information, and may not serve to reduce the cost of capital. Chang, 
Chen and Dasgupta (2012) also show that short-term institutions improve the 
transparency of the information environment through informed trading and monitoring 
via “exit”, allowing firms to issue securities that are more sensitive to information 
asymmetry at lower cost. Although direct internal monitoring, or monitoring via “voice” 
or intervention, can increase a firm’s value, effective internal monitoring may require a 
lengthy holding period to realize potential gains, thus short-term institutional investors 
usually monitor the firm via “exit”, or “vote with their feet”, due to their short-term focus. 
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Their trading based on private information and monitoring via “exit” create a more 
transparent environment. From this perspective, short-term institutional investors are 
effective in reducing information asymmetry problem, resulting in lower costs to 
bondholders as reflected as lower credit spreads. 
Some studies assert that institutional investors with short investment horizons 
myopically price the firm, and such short-term focus has adverse effects on the portfolio 
companies. This is known as short-term pressure hypothesis. Myopic mispricing 
combined with high levels of ownership by short-horizon institutions could force 
managers adopt short-term strategies that are detrimental to firms’ long-run performance 
in order to prevent a large scale selling of the stocks held by such shareholders. Porter 
(1992) notes that a short-term focus by institutional investor forces managers to be overly 
concerned with short-term performance metrics such as quarterly earnings. Bushee (1998, 
2001) demonstrates that the presence of transient/short-term investors increases the 
probability that managers will reduce R&D to reverse an earnings decline, and increase 
the firm’s expected near-term earnings. Burns, Kedia and Lipson (2010) show that 
transient institutions/short-term institutional investors are likely to focus management 
attention on short-term reported performance, that provide incentives to manipulate 
earnings. Dallas (2012) argues that the recent financial crisis was preceded by a period of 
financial firms seeking short-term profit regardless of long-term consequences. To sum 
up, short-term pressure hypothesis implies that short-term institutional ownership is 
positively related to firms’ credit spreads.  
Edmans (2009), on the other hand, argues that liquid market and transient 
shareholders in the U.S. do not exacerbate myopia, but rather enhance the allocational 
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efficiency of prices: informed trading can encourage long-term investment by 
impounding the workings of the price mechanism. From this perspective, short-term 
institutions are not detrimental to portfolio firm’s innovation and long-run development. 
Aghion, Reenen and Zinglales (2013) show a positive relation between firm’s innovation 
and institutional ownership. They also demonstrate that both transient and 
dedicated/long-term institutions have a positive association with innovation. As long as 
the investment is not extremely riskier than the projects on a firm’s portfolio to cause a 
risk-shifting problem, short-term institutional ownership is negative related to the firm’s 
credit spreads. Therefore, the validity of short-term pressure hypothesis is an open 
question based on extant literature.  
Overall, the impact of short-term institutional investors on a firm’s credit risk 
depends on the trade-off of their role in reducing information asymmetry and adverse 
impact on firm’s investment decisions: 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  short-term institutional investors reduce information asymmetries which 
benefit bondholders, as reflected in lower credit spreads. 
Hypothesis 1b:  the pressure from short-term institutional investors has adverse effects 
on the firm, as reflected in higher credit spreads. 
 
4.1.2 Long-term Institutional Investors and Credit Risk 
 
Although short-term institutional investors prefer to monitor via “exit”, long-term 
institutional investors prefer to monitor the firm via voice or direct intervention in order 





 The extant literature shows that effective internal monitoring will 
increase the firm’s performance and value, which will benefit both shareholders and 
bondholders. This is referred to as the shared benefits hypothesis. Long-term institutions 
are often regarded as effective internal monitors to reduce the pressure for managerial 
myopic and opportunistic behavior and boost firm’s long-run performance (see e.g. 
Bushee, 1998, 2001, Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2005, Chen, Harford and Li, 2007). 
Therefore, shared benefits hypothesis predicts a negative relation between long-term 
institutional ownership and firms’ credit spreads. On the other hand, due to their 
influential role in intervening in firms’ investment and financing decisions, long-term 
institutional investors can cause the conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
bondholders, increasing the wealth transfer from bondholder wealth to shareholders 
(wealth transfer hypothesis). Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose a risk shifting/asset 
substitution problem that stockholders have incentives to force managers to invest in new 
projects that are extremely risky to increase both the mean and the variance of future cash 
flows. As a consequence, their creditors bear higher default risk, while shareholders 
benefit if the project is successful. Thus, convexity in cash flow payoffs will increase 
levered firms’ default probabilities, which will benefit shareholders at the expense of 
bondholders. As noted by Myers (1977), firms near financial distress may not be able to 
exploit promising valuable projects, which will lower their expected future cash flows 
and increase their risk of bankruptcy. Dhillon and Johnson (1994) show that bondholders 
have a negative response to dividend increases. Parrino (1997) illustrates the wealth 
transfer from bondholders to shareholders in the case of the Marriott spinoff. To sum up, 
                                                             
20   Such interventions would include asserting their voting power, writing open letters to management or 




the impact of institutional ownership on a firm’s credit risk depends on the trade-off of 
shared benefits effect and wealth transfer effect: 
Hypothesis 2:  The impact of long-term institutional ownership on a firm’s credit risk 
depends on the trade-off of shared benefit and wealth transfer effect.  
 
4.1.3 Concentrated Ownership, Shareholder Activism and Credit Risk 
 
Although ownership concentration can provide institutional investors incentive 
and power to effectively monitor the firm and reduce managerial opportunism, the 
presence of outside blockholders can accelerate the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and bondholders than dispersed shareholders. Firms with strong shareholder 
rights are more likely to be taken over and result in an increase in leverage, especially in 
the case of leveraged buyouts (e.g. Warga and Welch, 1993, Billett, Jiang and Lie, 2010). 
Hence, bondholders of firms with concentrated shareholder ownership, representing 
strong shareholder rights, will demand higher credit spreads as compensation for the 
added risk they face. In addition, a large of literature shows the adverse impact of 
shareholder activism on bondholder wealth. Moody’s special comment in 2007 provides 
numerous examples of firms in concessions to shareholder activists that have eroded 
firms’ credit quality. A common theme in negative rating actions revolves around a 
company’s financial polity that increase dividend or share buyback program achieved 
through higher leverage. Li and Xu (2010) confirm that hedge fund activism increases 
credit risk by exacerbating shareholder expropriation of bondholder wealth in the context 
of bank loan contracting. Their results show that after the targeting announcement by 
hedge fund activists, hedge fund target firms pay higher spreads, put up more collateral, 
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and have shorter loan maturities. Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2008) show that 
blockholders increase firms’ payouts. Klein and Zur (2011) find hedge fund activism 
significantly reduces existing bondholders’ wealth by destroying collateral value (e.g. 
dissipating cash and current assets through special dividend disbursement) and increasing 
firm leverage. 
More importantly, outside ownership concentration could provide institutional 
investors strong market power and ability to exercise undue influence over management 
to secure benefits that are detrimental to other stakeholders, including minority 
shareholders and bondholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003), 
which is known as private benefit hypothesis. It is different from wealth transfer 
hypothesis that exits between shareholders and bondholders. Private benefit is enjoyed 
only by shareholders with concentrated ownership at the expense of other stakeholders. 
Examples of private benefit include easier access to private information, below-market 
transfer prices, and underwriting or advisory contracts, etc. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) 
claim that concentrated institutional ownership has an adverse effect on bond yields and 
ratings due to the private benefits enjoyed by institutional blockholders. Private benefit 
hypothesis suggests that concentrated ownership is positively related to credit spreads.  
Based on extensive evidence on the detrimental effects of institutional investors with 
concentrated ownership, I propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The impact of ownership concentration generally has an adverse impact 





4.2. Data and Methodology 
4.2.1 Data and Sample 
 
I collect quarterly institutional holdings data from the first quarter of 2000 to the 
fourth quarter of 2011 from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database 
(formerly known as the 13F CDA- Spectrum database), accessible through Wharton 
Research Data Services (WRDS). This database provides quarterly information on 
institutional common stock holdings and transactions starting from 1980, as reported on 
Form 13F filed with the SEC. Institutional managers with $100 million or more in assets 
under discretionary management are required by law to report their equity positions 
greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 to SEC on a quarterly basis. My initial sample 
includes all the firms covered in this database and free of survivorship bias as the 
database contains the filings of defunct institutions. Observations with incorrect data are 
dropped from the sample (i.e. institutional ownership percentage larger than one hundred). 
Firm accounting information is collected from the Compustat quarterly file. I use 
quarterly observations to align with available quarterly institutional holding data. Firms’ 
market data such as stock price, trading volume, shares outstanding, are collected from 
the CRSP daily file.  
I use credit default swap (CDS) spreads to measure a firm’s credit risk due to the 
advantageous features of CDS explained in the Section 1. Daily quoted CDS spreads are 
collected from the Markit Group from the calendar years 2001 to 2011. I first use the 
most liquid 5-year maturity contracts on US dollar-dominated senior unsecured debt 
(SNRFOR) with modified restructuring (MR) for US based issuers. As a robustness 
check, I also use contracts with other maturities (i.e. 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-, 10, and 20-year). I take 
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average of daily spreads to obtain a quarterly spread as my dependent variable.  I also 
control for firm and market conditions that might affect a firm’s credit spreads. 
Specifically, I control a firm’s credit rating (CRATE), market wide default risk measured 
by the difference between interest rates of Moody’s Aaa rating corporate bonds and Baa 
rating corporate bonds (DEF). I also control the term structure of interest rates as 
measured by the difference between 10-year interest rate swap rate and 1-year interest 
rate swap rate (SLOPE). The accounting and market variables used in this study include 
firm size (LNSIZE), measured by the natural log of  a firm’s inflation adjusted market 
capitalization, return on asset to measure a firm’s profitability (ROA), book to market 
ratio to measure a firm’s growth opportunity (BM), dividend payment dummy variable 
(DIV), tangibility (TAN), stock return over the previous quarter (RETt-3,t-1) and over the 
nine months preceding the last quarter (RETt-12,t-4), stock return volatility(VOL), log of 
stock price (LOGP) and stock average turnover ratio (TURN) used to control for liquidity 




The sample consists of all U.S. industrial firms (SIC codes between 2000 to 5999 
in line with previous literature
22
) with information of CDS contracts. After eliminating 
missing observations, my final sample consists of unbalanced panel of 515 firms from 
2001 to 2011, with 13,960 firm/quarter observations. I use 2011 as the base year to adjust 
for inflation where appropriate and winsorize ownership and control variables at the top 
                                                             
21  Adding additional control variable leverage ratio does not affect the sign and the magnitude of the 
coefficients of governance variables, and my results and conclusions remain unchanged. 




and bottom 0.5% of their distributions to mitigate the effect of outliers. The details of the 
variable names, definitions and data sources are shown in Table 9. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
4.2.2 Classification of Short- and Long-term Institutional Investors 
 
For each firm and each quarter covered in the Thomson-Reuters database, I 
identify short-term and long-term investors based on their aggregate portfolio turnover 
over the past four quarters, following Yan and Zhang (2009), as follows. 
First, I calculate the aggregate purchase and sale for each institution each quarter: 
         ∑ |                                       |         
  
                           (1) 
          ∑ |                                       |         
  
                            (2) 
Where      is the stock price for stock i at the end of quarter t,       is the price change of 
stock i from quarter t-1 to quarter t-1, and        is the number of shares of stock i held by 
institutional investor k at the end of quarter t.    is the total number of stocks held by 
institutional investor k. I adjust for stock splits and dividends by using the CRSP price 
adjustment factor, and adjust stock volume by using the CRSP volume adjustment factor, 
respectively.          and           are institution k’s aggregate purchase and sale for 
quarter t, respectively. Institution k’s churn rate for quarter t is then defined as: 
      
    (        
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∑
                         
 
  
   
                                                                                     (3) 
Next, I estimate each institution’s average churn rate over the past four quarters as: 
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                                                                                              (4) 
Given the above average churn rate for each institution each quarter, I sort all 
institutional investors into two groups each quarter based on their median average churn 
rate. Institutional investors with an above median churn rate are classified as short-term 
institutional investors, while those with below median churn rate are classified as long-
term institutional investors. Chart A of Figure 2 shows the time series of the mean and 
median of average churn rate for our sample institutions. The median and mean of the 
time series average churn rate fall in the range of 7.2% to 9.9%, and 11.3% to 14.5%, 
respectively. I aggregate institutional ownership information for each firm-quarter based 
on the type of institutional investors. Chart B of Figure 2 shows the market value of total 
institutional stock holdings, market value of long-term institutional stock holdings and 
market value short-term institutional stock holdings, respectively for our sample 
institutions. The market value of stocks held by my sample institutions increased from 
2001 and reached to a peak of $14 trillion in September, 2007, then fell down to $6.9 
trillion in March 2009. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In addition, for each firm, I consider the total institutional ownership (IO_total), 
ownership by the largest five institutions (IO_top5), ownership by all blockholders 
(IO_block) while blockholder is defined as institutions owns at least 5% of a firm’s total 
outstanding shares. Then I split IO_total into short-term institutional ownership 
(IO_total_short) and long-term institutional ownership (IO_total_long), IO_top5 into 
IO_top5_short and IO_top5_long, and IO_block into IO_block_short and IO_block_long. 
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Table 10 Panel A to Panel C provides summary statistics of institutional ownership 
variables for my sample firms, after matching institutional ownership with accounting, 
market and CDS information. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Panel A of Table 10 shows summary statistics of the variables, and Panel B provides the 
Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables of my sample. The market capitalization 
of the median firm is $ 9.3 billion in 2011 dollars. 98% of the sample firms are 
components of S&P 500 firms, and can be regarded as large companies.  About 82% of 
the sample firms have at least one institutional blockholder. Long-term institutions in 
general hold larger portion of sample firms’ total outstanding shares than short-term 
institutions do. Panel C of Table 10 provides description of the largest ten institutions 
based on market value of stock holdings at the end of year 2006 (pre-crisis), and 2011 
(post-crisis), respectively. The panel reports the rank, name, total market capitalization of 
stockholdings, investment horizon (short-term or long-term) based on average churn rate 
of Equation (3), and the legal type of the largest twenty institutions. The full legal type of 
institutions includes bank trust (BNK), insurance company (INS), investment company 
(INV), independent investment advisor (IIA), corporate (private) pension fund (CPS), 
public pension fund (PPS), university and foundation endowments (UFE) and 
miscellaneous (MSC). 
23
 The largest twenty institutions are dominated by banks, 
investment companies, and independent investment advisors, and dominated by long-
term institutions. Banks such as State Street, Mellon bank, Northern Trust, Bank of 
                                                             
23 Due to a mapping error, Thomson-Reuters’ legal type classification is not accurate after 1998. We thank 
Brain Bushee for provision of an alternative updated classification scheme. 
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America are classified as long-term type. Goldman, JP Morgan, and Fidelity are 
classified as short-term type. 
 
4.2.3 Empirical Methodology 
 
Estimating the impact of institutional ownership on firm’s credit spread might 
have self-selection bias as institutional investors might choose portfolio firms based on 
their risk appetites. In order to test whether institutional ownership is endogenously 
related to firm’s credit spread, I perform Hausman (1978) test of endogeneity. As 
previous literature shows a home bias of institutional investment, I use three instrumental 
variables to capture the exogenous tendency of institutional investors to invest firms that 
are geographically close: INSTRU_all, estimated as the average of total institutional 
ownership estimated across all the other firms with headquarters located in the same state 
in U.S.; INSTRU_short, estimated as the average of short-term institutional ownership 
estimated across all the other firms located in the same state in U.S.; INSTRU_long, 
estimated as the average of long-term institutional ownership estimated across all the 
other firms located in the same state in U.S. As the credit spread of one firm is unlikely to 
affect the institutional ownership proxies of all other firms in the same state (the 
instrument), the instrument is unlikely to correlate with the error term of the CDS 
regression equation (6). I exclude states with only one firm because I can compute the 
instrumental variable only for state with more than one firm at each quarter end, causing 
the deletion of only 221observations.  
To perform the Hausman test, I first perform an OLS regression of the 
institutional ownership equation (5) on the instrumental variable and all the other 
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exogenous variables. I include firm-fixed effects that control for potential omitted 
variable bias and year-fixed effects. The institutional ownership variables correspond to 
each of the ownership proxy group (e.g. IO_total, IO_total_short, IO_total_long, etc.) 
measured at the end of quarter t. The instrumental variables and firm control variables are 
lagged one quarter.    are the time-invariant firm-fixed effects and    are the year fixed 
effect. The variable       is the regression residual that I need to use in the second stage 
of the Hausman test. 
 
                                                                         
                                                                  
                                                                       
(5) 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Table 11 shows the results of regression (5), the determinants of total institutional 
ownership and concentrated ownership. It shows that there is indeed a home bias as the 
coefficient of the instrumental variable for each ownership proxy is significantly positive 
at 1% level.
24
 Model (1) shows that institutional investors prefer stocks with high 
turnover, high returns in the previous quarter, low volatility, and non-S&P500 
membership. Models (2) and (3) show the different preferences for short-term and long-
term institutions. While short-term institutions prefer profitable, low dividend paying, 
high turnover, and non-S&P500 stocks, long-term institutions are indifferent with those 
                                                             
24 The F-statistics of the instrument coefficient are all above 10, therefore it seems that our coefficient 
estimators do not suffer weak instruments bias. 
62 
 
factors. In addition, short-term institutions prefer stocks with positive last quarter’s return 
and previous three quarter’s return, while long-term institutional holding is negatively 
related to past return. Models (5) and (8) show that short-term institutional investors with 
concentrated ownership prefer small firms, stocks with high turnover and non-S&P500 
membership, while long-term institutions with concentrated ownership show different 
preferences.  
In the second stage of the Hausman (1978) test, I perform the regression of CDS 
spreads on institutional holding and all the other control variables (lagged by one quarter) 
in the CDS equation, as well as the variable  resid as regressors: 
 
                                                                   
                                                                     
                                                                                               (6)                                                                                        
 
Table 12 shows the second stage regression results of Hausman (1978) test of 
endogeneity.    
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
The results of the regression confirm that with the exception of total institutional 
ownership, all the other ownership proxies are endogeneous variables, as the coefficients 
of ownership proxy residuals are significant at 1% significance level. Given this 
endogeneity, I proceed to use two-stage-least-squares to estimate the impact of 
institutional ownership on firms’ credit spreads. Specifically, the first stage regression is 
the same as described as equation (5); I predict the institutional ownership proxies 
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(lagged one quarter related to credit spread measurement) using the instrumental 
variables along with all the exogenous firm-specific variables (lagged two quarters 
related to credit spread measurement). For the second stage regression shown in equation 
(7), I use the predicted values of endogenous institutional ownership proxies from the 
first stage (except for IO_total) in the CDS equations. 
 
                     (         )                                  
                                                                     
                                                                                             (7)   
 
4.3 Regression Results 
4.3.1 Institutional Ownership and CDS spreads  
 
I first use the most liquid five-year CDS contract spread to measure a firm’s credit 
risk. Table 13 Panel A shows my results of the second step 2SLS regression. 
25
 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
As evident from Table 13, total institutional ownership is negatively related to a 
firm’s credit spread. In Model (1), the coefficient of IO_total is significantly negative at 5% 
level, suggesting that bondholders share the benefits of monitoring by institutional 
investors to reduce managerial opportunistic behavior, or the improved firms’ 
information environment. However, this result is driven by short-term institutions only. 
As shown in Model (2), the coefficient of IO_total_short is -0.227 and is significant at 1% 
                                                             
25 The standard errors shown in the following tables are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the 
firm level.  
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level, while the coefficient of IO_total is not significant.  Based on these estimates, a one 
percentage point increase in the ownership by short-term institutions leads to a 0.227 
percentage point decrease of firm’s credit spread holding other variables constant. These 
results imply that institutions with short-term investment horizon have a positive impact 
on bondholder wealth, if I use credit spreads to measure bondholder wealth. The results 
are consistent with the findings of Yan and Zhang (2009), Chang, Chen and Dasgupta 
(2012), who find that short-term institutional investor can reduce a firm’s information 
asymmetry and improve informational environment through intense trading activity, 
monitor via “exit”. Therefore, my hypothesis 1a is supported. Model (3) and (4) in Panel 
A show that long-term institutional ownership is positively related to a firm’s credit 
spread. Keeping short-term institutional ownership constant, one percentage point 
increase in long-term institutional ownership is associated with a 0.065 percentage point 
increase of firm’s credit spread. Therefore, agency cost of debt dominates the shared 
benefit through monitoring. If this is the case, I would expect a higher impact of long-
term institutional investors with concentrated ownership on a firm’s credit risk. The 
results from next section confirm this expectation. 
In order to further check the informational role of short-term institutional 
investors, I examine the change of the institutional ownership proxies, following 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Yan and Zhang (2009). Specifically, I decompose the 
total ownership proxies (e.g. IO_all) into the lagged level (Lag_IO_all) and the change of 
levels (∆IO_all) over the previous quarter. Panel B of Table 13 shows the impact of the 
trading by different institutional investors on a firm’s credit spread. Model (1) shows that 
both the demand shock (Lag_IO_all) and the trading (∆IO_all) by institutional investors 
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are negatively related to a firm’s credit spread. This result is driven by short-term 
institutional investors only, as is shown in Model (2). Model (4) shows that after 
accounting for short-term institutional ownership and trading, the trading by long-term 
institutions has no impact on firms’ credit spread. Hence, trading by short-term 
institutions improves the firm’s information environment, which benefits bondholders. 
The above results support hypothesis 1a and the wealth transfer hypothesis.  
 
4.3.2 Concentrated Ownership, Shareholder Activism and Credit Risk 
 
Table 14 shows the impact of concentrated ownership by institutions with 
different investment horizons on a firm’s credit spread. I use two measures of ownership 
concentration: blockholders who own at least 5% of a firm’s total outstanding shares, and 
the largest five institutions. Models (1) - (4) show similar results. Concentrated 
ownership has a negative impact on a firm’s credit risk and bondholder wealth. The total 
blockholder ownership, ownership by long-term blockholders and short-term 
blockholders are all positively related to a firms’ credit risk. The investment horizon now 
is no longer a distinguishing factor that can influence a firm’s credit spread, as we can see 
that all the ownership concentration proxies are significantly positive at 1% level. These 
results are in accordance with Bhojaraj and Sengupta (2003), Cremers, Nair and Wei 
(2007) who also document conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders, 
and are in accordance with Bhojrj and Sengupta (2003) who document the private 
benefits enjoyed by institutional blockholders on other stakeholders. My results imply 
that from the perspective of debtholders, the wealth transfer effect, and private benefits 
caused by institutional stockholders with concentrated ownership is a serious concern that 
outweighs fairly negligible shared benefit effects.  
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4.3.3 Crisis vs. Non-crisis Period 
 
I further separate my sample into two periods:  a “normal” period from 2001 to 
2006 and a crisis period from 2007-2008. Table 15 shows the impacts of institutional 
ownership on a firm’s credit spread for these two samples, separately.  
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
The results for the normal period are similar to my full sample regression results.  
However, the crisis period results differ substantively. Model (2) of Panel B shows that 
during the crisis period, short-term institutional ownership is associated with higher credit 
risk, as shown in model (2). There might be several potential explanations. Funding 
shortfalls is a major concern for corporations and institutions during financial crisis. 
Decline in assets value, margins increase, or investors withdraw funds could cause a 
liquidity squeeze, which could cause liquidation funds prematurely or fire sales. This 
behavior can deteriorate liquidity in the market and cause further losses, which impact the 
portfolio firms and the overall financial stability. Shleifer and Vishny (2011) argue that 
fire sales occur during financial crisis because corporations need to sell assets to repay 
debt but other corporations in the same industry (specialist industry buyers who could 
extract high value from the assets) are unable to bid because the industry specialists are 
financially encumbered. Funding problems could lead to sharp decline in liquidity and 
stock prices. Therefore, during the crisis, stable long-term institutional investors stabilize 
portfolio firms’ prices, while frequent trading, especially selling activities, by short-term 
institutions will cause liquidity and price decline and increase the possibility of fire sale, 
which in turn will increase firm’s default probability and bankruptcy risk. Indeed, Cella, 
Ellul, and Giannetti (2011) find that short-term institutional investors, characterised by 
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high turnover, reduce their equity holdings more than other investors do during market 
declines. Due to this reason, short-term institutions that used to be liquidity providers 
during normal period now may turn into liquidity demanders. Mitchell and Pulvino (2011) 
argue that the disappearance of long-term financing caused arbitrageurs to withdraw 
liquidity from these markets, generating further price divergence during recent crisis. 
Another complementary explanation is that different from long-term institutions that 
focus on monitoring and firm’s long run development, short-term institutions avoid direct 
internal monitoring via “voice” but monitor via “exit” and trading, and focus on short-run 
trading profits. Model (6) shows the existence of positive relation between concentrated 
ownership by short-term institutions and credit spread. Therefore, firms’ default or 
bankruptcy risk induced from frequent trading, especially selling, and agency cost of debt 
are not concerns for short-term investors, resulting a serious adverse impact at times of 
market stress.  
The result of Panel B in Model (3) shows that although long-term institutors tend 
to induce more risk-taking during normal period, higher ownership by such investors is 
associated with lower credit risk levels during crisis period. The stable investment or 
funding provided by long-term institutions prevents corporations from financial distress, 
fire sales, liquidation and bankruptcy. Although long-term institutions induce more risk-
taking by corporations and increase agency cost of debt during normal period, their 
investment behavior might change during the abnormal crisis period, they may adopt 
conservative investment strategies. As we can see that during the crisis period, the 
concentrated ownership by long-term institutional investors do not adversely affect 
bondholder wealth anymore, while it does harm bondholder wealth during normal period. 
68 
 
The results show that the conflicts of interest between long-term institutional 
blockholders and bondholders are mitigated during such period as both try to avoid 
default and bankruptcy. When the ownership variables of both long-term and short-term 
institutions are jointly included in model (4), the impact of short-term institutions on 
credit spreads is no longer significant. In addition, with the differential effects of short-
term and long-term institutional investors, the total institutional ownership has no impact 
on a firm’s credit risk, as shown in model (1). 
The results from crisis period indirectly support the argument that although 
frequent trading by short-term institutions during normal period improve corporations’ 
financial environment, long-term institutions perform an important role in enhancing 
financial stability during crisis period, and provide better monitoring and stable funding 
to reduce the likelihood of fire sale and bankruptcy, as is reflected in lower credit spreads. 
  
4.3.4 Robustness Test  
4.3.4.1 CDS contracts with different maturity 
 
In addition to 5-year CDS spread, I also use contracts with maturities of 1-year, 2-
year, 3-year, 10-year and 20-year in the analysis. As shown in Panel A of Table 16, I find 
that the general conclusion from 4.1 does not change even I use contracts with different 
maturities. That is, total institutional ownership is negatively associated with firms’ credit 
spreads. Ownership by short-term (long-term) institutions decreases (increases) firms’ 
credit spreads. Both short-term and long-term institutions with concentrated ownership 
positions serve to increase firms’ credit spreads. In sum, the negative (positive) relation 
of short-term (long-term) institutional ownership on firms’ credit spreads does not change 
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with the maturity of different contracts. Furthermore, concentrated ownership has a 
negative impact on bondholder wealth, and this impact does not change with the increase 
in the maturity of the contracts. 
[Insert Table 16 about here] 
 
4.3.4.2 Alternative definition of short-term and long-term institutions  
 
Instead of separating institutions based on their median average churn rate over 
the past four quarters,         , as a robustness check, I separate institutions into three 
tertile portfolios based on         , following Yan and Zhang (2009). Table 17 shows 
the regression results based on this alternative definition of short-term and long-term 
institutions. As the table shows, our main conclusions do not change: short-term 
institutional ownership is significantly negatively related to 5-year CDS spread while 
long-term institutional ownership is significantly related credit spread. Concentrated 
ownership by short-term and long-term institutions is positively related to credit spread. 
Thus, my results in Section 4.3 are robust to this alternative definition of institution type.  
I use alternative definition of turnover, considering net flows and redemptions 
based on Equation (3)’ below: 
      
        
          
      (        )
∑               
  
   
                                                             (3)’ 
I then classify short-term and long-term institutional investors following the same 
procedures in Part 3.2, and perform the 2SLS regression. The findings are consistent with 
our prior conclusion.  
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I also perform fixed effect panel regressions using Bushee’s (1998, 2001) 
classification of institutional investors.  Bushee classifies institutions into “transient”, 
“dedicated” and “quasi-indexers” based on their past investment behavior. Specifically, 
“transient” institutions are characterized as having high portfolio turnover and highly 
diversified portfolio holdings. This type of institutions tends to be short-term focused. 
“Dedicated” institutions are characterized by extremely low portfolio turnover and large 
investments in portfolio firms; “Quasi-indexers” are also characterized by low turnover, 
but they have diversified holdings. Both dedicated and quasi-indexers provide long-term, 
stable ownership to portfolio firms. The regression results based on Bushee classification 
show that: during the non-crisis period from 2001 to 2006, total ownership by transient 
institutions is significantly negatively related to credit spread at 10% level, while 
ownership by dedicated and quasi-indexers are not significant with the presence of 
transient institutions. During the crisis period, ownership by dedicated and quasi-indexer 
institutions is significantly negatively related to credit spread. So our main conclusions 
that short-term institutional investors reduce firm credit risk during normal period, while 
long-term institutional investors reduce firm credit risk during the crisis period are 
maintained based on Bushee’s classification. 
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter provides evidence that institutional ownership and investment 
horizon perform important roles in credit market pricing. On the one hand, institutional 
investors provide monitoring services, and their trading improves the information 
environment, which can boost firms’ overall performance, reduce information asymmetry 
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and benefit bondholders in general. On the other hand, however, concentrated ownership 
by institutional investors may enhance the agency cost of debt and increase the private 
benefit enjoyed by shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders and bondholders. 
My results show that the impact of investment horizons of institutional investors on 
industrial firms’ credit risk levels is both statistically significant and economically sizable, 
after considering endogeneity of institutional ownership. Over the entire sample period of 
2001-2011 and the non-crisis period from 2001 to 2006, higher institutional ownership is 
negatively related to CDS spreads. This result is primarily driven by short-term 
institutional investors, which suggests that firms’ creditors benefit from the improved 
information environment created by short-term institutions. Concentrated ownership of 
both short-term and long-term institutional investors generally increases firms’ credit risk 
for the entire sample period, supporting the existence of a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and bondholders and the private benefit of institutional blockholders. 
However, during the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2008, higher ownership by firms’ 
long-term institutional investors reduces firms’ credit risk. Therefore, long-term 
institutions play an important role during the crisis period to reduce firms’ credit risk and 
avert the threat of bankruptcy. My results should be of considerable interest to 
researchers, practitioners and policy makers. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation I analyze the importance of governance mechanisms from the 
perspective of bondholders, given the importance of debt financing in the U.S. market 
and the relative underdeveloped literature in this line of research. The recent financial 
crisis also motivates this dissertation. On the one hand, monitoring from shareholders 
reduces conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers, and information 
asymmetry between insiders and capital providers, such benefits can be shared by 
bondholders. On the other hand, given the convex payoff and limited liability, 
shareholders have different risk preferences than those of bondholders. Governance 
mechanisms that serve shareholder may not serve bondholders in this regard due to the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and bondholders. Through different chapters in 
this dissertation, I consider a comprehensive set of governance mechanisms that are 
deemed to have impact on a firm’s investment and financing policy, managerial moral 
hazard and information environment quality, which should in turn affect the riskiness of a 
firm and bondholder wealth.  I look at the internal monitoring role from the board of 
directors. Board characteristics such as board size, board independency, board expertise 
and CEO duality are considered. I also look at a firm’s accounting transparency, as well 
as equity ownership structure, especially the equity holdings of CEO and institutional 
investors. In addition, the discipline role of the external takeover market is also 
considered by using the E-index, representing a firm’s takeover vulnerability. Given the 
rapid growth of institutional investors and their active monitoring and trading activity, I 
examine how institutional investment horizon, ownership and trading affect a firm’s 
credit risk through different channels.  
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In Chapter 2, I explore the direct impact of various corporate governance 
attributes that are deemed important to shareholders on the credit risk of financial and 
non-financial firms in the U.S. The results show that both the risk levels as well as the 
factors affecting risk differ considerably between financial firms and non-financial firms. 
This result may reflect structural factors, such as regulatory provisions that limit the 
riskiness of financial firms relative to non-financial firms.  Financial firms may also 
provide lower risk for bondholders to the extent that they are more adept at managing 
default risk due to their diversified portfolios of assets vs. non-financial firms. More 
independent boards and a high level of financial transparency are associated with lower 
default probability for financial firms only. For non-financial firms, greater board 
expertise, and lower takeover exposure are associated with lower bond default probability. 
CEO ownership has a concave impact on bond default probability, showing both 
incentive alignment and entrenchment effects exist as CEO ownership increases, with an 
inflection point at 40% based on my sample.  
I further look at the impacts of corporate governance structures on credit risk 
levels of banks in the U.S. in Chapter 3. The results show that estimated five year default 
probabilities of U.S. banks are time varying and took a significant jump in the year prior 
to the financial crisis of 2008-9. The results show that banks with higher market to book 
ratios are associated with higher default probabilities. Small banks, banks with higher 
leverage and lower ROA are more likely to default. Corporate governance mechanisms 
affect commercial banks more than savings institutions in US. The risk taking behaviors 
of U.S. banks are affected by several governance structure variables, including: board 
size, board independence, institutional ownership, as well as the age of the CFO and 
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whether directors are serving other firms as CEOs. I provide evidence that, after 
controlling for firm specific characteristics, commercial banks with larger and more 
independent boards are associated with significantly lower default risk.  These results are 
consistent with Chapter 2 on the sample of financial firm. In addition, the results also 
show that lower ownership by institutional investors and older CFOs are associated with 
significantly lower credit risk levels, implying that experienced CFO are beneficial. For 
the full sample including both commercial and savings banks, larger board size, older 
CFO and less busy directors are associated with lower credit risk levels, also 
economically and statistically significant. When I restrict the sample to allow for 
consideration of the joint effects of the governance variables, the results on board size 
and busy directors are maintained. While a smaller board benefits shareholders through 
the reduced coordination and communication issues, internal conflicts among directors, 
and free rider problems, a relatively large board serves bondholders especially in distress 
states through the precious resources of human capital and social/relational capital. The 
results from both Chapters 2 and 3 show that the monitoring role of the board of directors 
is an important governance mechanism for bondholders although the board size has 
different impacts on bondholders and shareholders.  
Chapter 4 explores the time varying nature of firm credit risk and of institutional 
governance that affect such risk through internal direct monitoring, monitoring via “exit” 
or trading activity, with particular attention to the role of the underlying state of the 
economy. This chapter provides evidence that institutional ownership and investment 
horizon perform important roles in credit market pricing. On the one hand, institutional 
investors provide monitoring services, and their trading improves the information 
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environment, which can boost firms’ overall performance, reduce information asymmetry 
and benefit bondholders in general. On the other hand, concentrated ownership by 
institutional investors may enhance the agency cost of debt and increase the private 
benefit enjoyed by shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders and bondholders. 
My results show that the impact of investment horizons of institutional investors on 
industrial firms’ credit risk levels is both statistically significant and economically sizable, 
after considering endogeneity of institutional ownership. Over the entire sample period of 
2001-2011 and the non-crisis period from 2001 to 2006, higher institutional ownership is 
negatively related to CDS spreads. This result is primarily driven by short-term 
institutional investors, which suggests that the firms’ creditors benefit from the improved 
information environment created by short-term institutional investors. Concentrated 
ownership of both short-term and long-term institutional investors generally increases the 
firms’ credit risk for the entire sample period, supporting the existence of a conflict of 
interest between shareholders and bondholders and the private benefit of institutional 
blockholders. However, during the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2008, higher 
ownership by the firms’ long-term institutional investors reduces the firms’ credit risk. 
Therefore, long-term institutions play an important role during the crisis period to reduce 
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Figure 2: Time series of turnover ratio and institutional ownership 
Chart A: Time series of mean and median of average churn rate 




























































































































































































































































































































Tables for Chapter 2 
Table 1: Variable definition and Sources 
Table 1: Variables Definition and Sources   
Dependent Variables:   
cds_5y: the credit default swap of five year maturity contracts on US dollar-





BDSIZE: ln(total number of directors on a board)   Board Analyst 
BDOUTSIDE:number of independent directors over number of total directors Board Analyst 
dumsep:  1 if CEO and chairman is not separate individual, and 0 if not.                 
CEO power is measured by the inverse of dumsep; 
Board Analyst, 
CGQ 
dumaudit: 1 if audit committee is comprised wholly of independent directors, 
0 if not. 
Board Analyst, 
CGQ 
dumcomp: 1 if compensation committee is comprised wholly of independent 
directors, 0 if not. 
Board Analyst, 
CGQ 
dumnom: 1 if nominating committee is comprised wholly of independent 
directors, 0 if not. 
Board Analyst, 
CGQ 
BDEXP: number of directors with more than 4 directorships over number of 
total directors 
Board Analyst 
E_value: anti-takeover governance score  
Bebchuk et al. 
2009 
CEOhold:  stock held by CEO over the total shares outstanding Board Analyst 
CEOhold2: squire term of CEOhold Board Analyst 
Insti: stocks held by institutional investors over total shares outstanding. Board Analyst 
Control Variables:  
Lsize:log(total book value of asset) Bloomberg 
ROA: return on asset; Bloomberg item: RETURN_ON_ASSET Bloomberg 
LEVERAGE: total debt to total asset; Bloomberg item: 
TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET 
Bloomberg 
BM: book value to market value; 1 over Bloomberg item: 
PX_TO_BOOK_RATIO 
Bloomberg 
Vol: volatility of stock returns over the previous 180 trading days; Bloomberg 
Item: VOLATILITY_180D 
Bloomberg 
depth: the number of contributor prices used to build the composite price data. 




rate: the average of the Moody’s and S&P ratings adjusted to the seniority of 
the instruments and rounded to not include the "+" and "-"levels, ranging from 
D-AAA. We converted to rate 1-8: 1-D, 2-CCC, 3-B, 4-BB, 5-BBB, 6-A, 7-
AA, 8-AAA; 
Markit Group 
Tan:  net fixed asset (property, plant, and equipment) to total asset; Bloomberg 
Item: BS_NET_FIX_ASSET 
Bloomberg 
Capexp: capital expenditure to net asset; Bloomberg Item: 
CAPITAL_EXPEND 
Bloomberg 
netcash: cash and near cash item to net asset; net asset is total asset less cash 
and near cash item;                                                                                        




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Industry firms 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile 
Panel A: Non-financial firms 
cds_5y (%) 2359 1.62 3.01 0.36 0.69 1.71 
rate 2348 4.72 1.20 4.00 5.00 5.00 
depth (%) 2359 6.54 4.73 3.01 4.64 8.87 
Lsize 2184 8.90 1.33 8.07 8.85 9.71 
ROA 2170 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.08 
LEVERAGE 2184 0.30 0.16 0.20 0.28 0.39 
BM 1976 0.50 0.45 0.26 0.41 0.62 
Vol 2017 0.35 0.18 0.23 0.31 0.42 
tan 2181 0.34 0.22 0.16 0.30 0.51 
capexp 2180 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.07 
netcash 2183 0.08 0.22 0.01 0.04 0.10 
BDSIZE 2357 2.33 0.21 2.20 2.30 2.48 
BDOUTSIDE 2357 0.84 0.09 0.80 0.88 0.90 
BDEXP 2357 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.11 0.23 
Dumsep 2325 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
dumaudit 2355 0.93 0.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 
dumcomp 2342 0.93 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 
dumnom 2269 0.85 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 
E_value 2359 2.57 1.31 2.00 3.00 4.00 
CEOhold 1895 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Insti 1864 0.71 0.17 0.60 0.74 0.84 
 
Panel B: Financial firms 
cds_5y (%) 450 0.69 1.68 0.27 0.42 0.66 
rate 446 5.27 1.04 5.00 5.00 6.00 
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depth (%) 450 6.62 4.64 2.96 4.92 9.34 
Lsize 413 10.27 1.83 8.74 10.29 11.53 
ROA 412 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 
LEVERAGE 413 0.29 0.23 0.09 0.22 0.46 
BM 357 0.51 0.26 0.34 0.46 0.61 
Vol 357 0.26 0.12 0.18 0.22 0.31 
tan 362 0.25 0.37 0.01 0.02 0.55 
capexp 377 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.04 
netcash 411 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.04 
BDSIZE 450 2.42 0.27 2.20 2.40 2.64 
BDOUTSIDE 450 0.83 0.10 0.78 0.87 0.91 
BDEXP 450 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.25 
Dumsep 442 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
dumaudit 449 0.94 0.24 1.00 1.00 1.00 
dumcomp 442 0.95 0.21 1.00 1.00 1.00 
dumnom 438 0.89 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 
E_value 450 2.42 1.28 2.00 3.00 3.00 
CEOhold 336 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Insti 338 0.68 0.17 0.56 0.69 0.80 
 
Panel C: Tests of differences  
This table reports p-values for the null hypothesis of no difference in means and medians 
of financial and non-financial firms, respectively. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% 
level. 
CDS_5y (%) N Mean  Median 
Non-financial Firms 2359 1.617 0.689 













Panel D:  





Depository Banking Institutions 84 0.341 0.426 0.235 0.179 0.325 
Nondepository Credit Institutions 23 0.862 1.368 0.331 0.241 0.722 
Insurance Companies 169 0.881 2.583 0.478 0.309 0.832 
Security & Commodity Brokers 44 0.587 0.673 0.395 0.277 0.707 




Table 3: Pearson Correlations 
Table 3 shows the Pearson Correlations of independent variables, governance variables and sets of control variables. The details of the variables 
definition and sources are listed in Table 1. Panel A shows the correlations for industrial firms and Panel B shows those of financial firms. The bold text 
indicates the significant levels at or better than 0.01 levels.  
    A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q 
Panel A: Non-financial firms 
cds_5y A 1 
                rate B -0.41 
                depth C -0.15 0.07 
               Lsize D -0.08 0.32 0.37 
              ROA E -0.26 0.20 0.06 0.24 
             LEVERAGE F 0.34 -0.29 -0.06 -0.01 -0.13 
            BM G 0.28 -0.26 -0.07 -0.04 -0.35 0.09 
           Vol H 0.52 -0.22 -0.28 -0.15 -0.37 0.15 0.32 
          BDSIZE I -0.13 0.22 0.22 0.37 0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 
         BDEXP J -0.01 0.00 0.18 0.19 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.18 0.07 
        BDOUTSIDE K -0.06 0.04 0.17 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17 0.13 0.13 
       dumcomp L -0.06 -0.02 0.16 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.07 0.07 0.11 
      dumnom M -0.06 -0.02 0.26 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.19 -0.08 0.12 0.19 0.57 
     dumaudit N -0.01 -0.03 0.18 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.10 -0.07 0.06 0.09 0.70 0.54 
    E_value O -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.24 -0.06 0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.02 
   ceopower P -0.07 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.14 -0.07 0.07 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.19 0.10 
  CEOhold Q 0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.17 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.05 
 Insti R -0.03 -0.15 0.11 -0.25 0.04 -0.12 0.03 -0.07 -0.24 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.09 -0.10 
 
Panel B: Financial firms 
cds_5y A 1 
                rate B -0.20 
                depth1 C -0.13 0.00 
               Lsize D -0.26 0.48 0.29 
              ROA E 0.18 -0.32 -0.04 -0.58 
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LEVERAGE F -0.07 -0.07 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 
            BM G 0.05 -0.12 0.08 0.14 -0.41 -0.32 
           Vol H 0.38 0.00 -0.09 0.12 -0.08 -0.24 0.12 
          BDSIZE I -0.14 0.33 0.00 0.51 -0.19 -0.27 -0.08 0.00 
         BDEXP J -0.07 0.11 0.24 0.21 -0.07 -0.08 0.05 -0.18 0.09 
        BDOUTSIDE K -0.12 0.12 0.06 0.22 -0.11 -0.05 0.05 -0.07 0.31 0.16 
       dumcomp L -0.06 -0.01 0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.20 
      dumnom M -0.05 -0.09 0.20 -0.11 0.04 0.10 0.03 -0.35 -0.08 0.07 0.16 0.53 
     dumaudit N -0.06 -0.03 0.15 -0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.09 -0.22 -0.06 0.05 0.20 0.73 0.44 
    E_value O 0.12 -0.13 -0.22 -0.16 -0.01 0.07 0.12 0.14 -0.10 -0.05 0.23 0.05 0.04 0.07 
   ceopower P -0.01 0.09 0.02 0.19 -0.06 -0.10 0.01 -0.10 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.07 
  CEOhold Q 0.12 -0.07 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.09 -0.31 -0.13 -0.07 -0.24 -0.31 -0.03 
 Insti R -0.03 -0.33 0.22 -0.19 0.22 0.14 -0.22 0.06 -0.25 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.07 -0.01 -0.13 
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Table 4: Regression Results with CDS_5y as dependent variable 
Table 4 shows results of panel regression with fixed firm and year effects, which relates the 
default probabilities (cds_5y) to the accounting/market control variables as well as the corporate 
governance indicators. Variable definition and sources are presented in Table 1. P-values are 
reported below the variable coefficient . ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Non-financial firms  Financial firms 
  Model 1       Model 2         Model 3  Model 1         Model 2      Model 3 
BDSIZE -0.51  -0.48  -0.34*  -0.21 
 (0.11)  (0.27)  (0.07)  (0.43) 
BDEXP -0.84**  -1.06**  0.00  -0.08 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.99)  (0.83) 
BDOUTSIDE -0.80  0.08  -0.96***  -1.31** 
 (0.19)  (0.92)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
dumnom 0.02  0.15  -0.01  0.01 
 (0.87)  (0.39)  (0.87)  (0.91) 
dumcomp -0.31*  -0.35  0.13  0.21 
 (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.38)  (0.29) 
dumaudit 0.21  0.16  -0.25*  -0.29* 
 (0.22)  (0.44)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
E_value -0.18**  -0.42***  0.00  -0.11 
 (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.99)  (0.22) 
CEOhold  26.27*** 24.78***   2.44 3.77 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)   (0.35) (0.19) 
CEOhold2 -32.98*** -31.27***   -7.44* -16.01* 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)   (0.07) (0.07) 
dumsep  0.24* 0.28*   -0.04 0.023 
  (0.09) (0.07)   (0.69) (0.837) 
Insti  -1.23** -1.23**   -0.16 0.06 
  (0.03) (0.04)   (0.68) (0.89) 
Lsize 0.98*** 1.00*** 1.07***  -0.03 -0.33 -0.20 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.81) (0.16) (0.45) 
ROA -2.77*** -1.49* -1.61*  -0.27 0.54 -0.73 
 (0.00) (0.10) (0.09)  (0.84) (0.81) (0.75) 
LEVERAGE 0.09 0.43 0.50  0.11 0.62 0.47 
 (0.88) (0.58) (0.54)  (0.85) (0.60) (0.71) 
BM 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.76***  0.75*** 0.71*** 0.85*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.00) (0.00) 
Vol 1.54*** 1.02** 0.91**  0.51 0.69* 0.40 
 (<.0001) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.09) (0.36) 
depth1 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05**  -0.02* -0.02 -0.03* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) 
rate -0.20 -0.21 -0.27  -0.10 -0.11 -0.15 
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 (0.15) (0.32) (0.23)  (0.29) (0.49) (0.36) 
Intercept -4.19** -6.61** -3.42  2.32* 2.85 3.85 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.24)  (0.07) (0.20) (0.10) 
Firm FE& Year FE? Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Adj. R-squre 0.766 0.764 0.765  0.844 0.810 0.830 
Used Obs.  1810 1318 1260  327 204 193 
 
Table 5: Regression Results with netcash ratio as dependent variable for industrial 
firms 
Table 5 shows results of panel regression with fixed firm and year effects, which relates the 
netcash ratio to the accounting/market control variables as well as the ownership structure of the 
firm. Variable definition and sources are presented in Table 1. ***,**,* denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The adjusted R squire is 0.8266, and the 
used observation is 1312.  
Variable Estimate t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.561*** 4.28 <.0001 
CEOhold -0.797*** -2.98 0.003 
CEOhold2 0.986*** 2.96 0.003 
Dumsep 0.000 0.04 0.966 
Insti 0.027 1.03 0.304 
Lsize -0.040*** -3.11 0.002 
ROA 0.070 1.63 0.103 
LEVERAGE -0.020 -0.56 0.575 
BM -0.001 -0.18 0.855 
Vol 0.016 0.81 0.419 
tan -0.402*** -7.23 <.0001 




Tables for Chapter 3 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Distribution of accounting variables 
Total asset is the sum of book value of total liability and total equity. Following the literatures, I 
take the logarithm of total book asset value to control for the size of the bank in regression. 
Leverage: I define the leverage ratio as the total book value of debt divided by the total book 
value of the asset.  ROA or ROE are used to control for the profitability of the banks. The first one 
is return on asset (ROA) while the second one is return on equity (ROE).  Market to book ratio: 
the market to book ratio is defined as the market price divided by the book value of equity per 
share. 
Panel B: Distribution of corporate governance variables 
Sep dummy equals one if CEO and Chairman are separate. Board size is the total number of 
directors on a given board. Board Independence is estimated as the number of outside directors 
over the board size. Institutional Holding is the percent of outstanding shares held by institutions. 
Insider Holding is the estimated percentage of outstanding shares held by top management and 
directors. Director active CEOs is the percent of the sum of directors who are active CEOs of 









Number of Firms 187 27 14 228 
Number of  Observations 672 80 30 782 
Mean (Unit: $ Millions) 
Total Asset (Book Value) 39951 11774 8763 35872 
Short-term debt 4971 1582 1238 4482 
Long-term Debt 4152 2476 1686 3886 
Common Equity (Book Value) 3539 1053 1107 3192 
Leverage  17.27% 25.72% 26.82% 19% 
ROA 1.2% 1.1% 0.5% 1.1% 
ROE 13% 11.4% 4.8% 12.6% 
Market to Book 2.11 1.93 1.44 2.07 
Standard Deviation (Unit: $ Millions) 
Total Asset (Book Value) 131823 21761 8790 122812 
Short-term debt 20252 3134 1941 18842 
Long-term Debt 14842 6042 2679 13917 
Common Equity (Book Value) 11259 1635 1166 10487 
Leverage 9% 12.27% 16.09% 10.22% 
ROA 0.5% 1.1% 1.08% 0.6% 
ROE 5.7% 6.6% 11.58% 6.3% 
Market to Book 0.78 0.98 0.54 0.81 
Skewness 
Total Asset (Book Value) 7.20 3.67 1.41 7.74 
Short-term debt 8.68 2.98 2.08 9.34 
Long-term Debt 7.17 4.42 2.95 7.56 
Common Equity (Book Value) 6.98 2.99 1.45 7.52 
Leverage 1.09 -0.08 1.81 1.22 
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ROA 0.16 6.79 -4.32 2.74 
ROE -1.00 0.66 -3.39 -1.70 












CEO age 232 55.5 59.2 60.6 55.8 
CFO age 516 49.2 49.17 46.88 49.11 
Sep Dummy  21 0.53 0.6 1 0.54 
Board Size 782 13.34 10.75 11.03 12.98 
Board Independence 782 0.84 0.79 0.81 0.83 
Institutional Holding  396 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.44 
Insider Holding  626 0.19 0.33 0.25 0.21 
Director active CEOs 782 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.28 
Standard Deviation  
CEO age 232 6.35 7.86 4.16 6.55 
CFO age 516 6.67 7.92 5.91 6.79 
Sep Dummy 21 0.50 0.50 0 0.50 
Board Size 782 3.98 2.75 2.97 3.93 
Board Independence 782 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 
Institutional Holding  396 0.24 0.20 0.12 0.23 
Insider holding  626 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.17 
Director active CEOs 782 0.27 0.24 0.19 0.26 
 
Table 7: Five year default probabilities for each year for 2001-2010 
Year Full sample Commercial Federal Saving Non-Federal Saving 
2001 0.052928 0.053079 0.063562 0.004381 
2002 0.051098 0.039564 0.133799 0.017155 
2003 0.021078 0.020336 0.030251 0.000164 
2004 0.014117 0.013882 0.018030 0.005134 
2005 0.009125 0.009723 0.008617 0.000905 
2006 0.014653 0.016187 0.004401 0.012271 
2007 0.071471 0.070233 0.099905 0.037995 
2008 0.379383 0.386714 0.316090 0.380315 
2009 0.475212 0.494492 0.385448 0.356553 









Table 8: Summary of OLS Regression Results  
Table 8 shows results of the estimation of equation 6 which relates the default probabilities to the 
accounting/market control variables as well as the corporate governance indicators:  
              ∑    
 
         ∑    
 
             (5), where            is the estimated 
default probabilities for bank i at time t;      and      are the firm specific accounting / market 
variables and  governance indicators respectively. Sep dummy equals one if CEO and Chairman 
are separate. Board size is the total number of directors on a given board. Board Independence is 
estimated as the number of outside directors over the board size. Institutional Holding is the 
percent of outstanding shares held by institutions. Insider Holding is the estimated percentage of 
outstanding shares held by top management and directors. Director active CEOs is the percent of 
the sum of directors who are active CEOs of public or private companies on a given board. P-
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Adj. R-Sq 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 
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Adj. R-Sq 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.0951 0.08 
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Adj. R-Sq 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.0037 0.01 






Tables for Chapter 4 
 
Table 9: Variable Definition and Data Sources 
 Variables Definitions Data Sources 
LNMKT Natural logarithm of the market capitalization ($Mil) in 2011 dollars Compustat, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics  
LNSIZE Natural logarithm of the book value of total asset ($Mil) in 2011 dollars  Compustat, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics  
RET_t-3,t-1 Cumulative stock return over the past three months t-3 to t-1 CRSP 
RET_t-12,t-4 Cumulative stock return over the nine months preceding last quarter t-12 
to t-4 
CRSP 
LOGP Log of stock price, adjusted for split and dividend CRSP 
TURN Average turnover over the previous quarter t-3 to t-1 CRSP 
VOL Return volatility over the previous quarter t-3 to t-1 CRSP 
BM Ratio of the book value of equity per share to stock price  Compustat 
ROA Ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets Compustat 
DIV Ratio of dividend per share to stock price Compustat 
TAN Tangibility, measured by the ratio of net ppe to total asset Compustat 
LEV Ratio of total debt over total asset  Compustat 
SP500 S&P 500 dummy variable equals to one if the firm is a S&P 500 firm and 
0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
CDS_Iy Average daily quoted spreads for I-year CDS contracts within  a quarter; I 
could be 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20 
Markit 
CRATE Natural log of the average rating (Rating), changed to numerical scale 
from letter scale: 1-D, 2-CCC, 3-B, 4-BB, 5-BBB, 6-A, 7-AA, 8-AAA; 
Markit 
DEF Difference between interest rates of Moody's Aaa rating corporate bonds 
and Baa rating corporate bonds 
Federal Rserve H15 
Report 
SLOPE Difference between 10-year interest rate swap rate and 1-year  interest rate 
swap rate  
Federal Rserve H15 
Report 
INSTRU_all Average of total institutional ownership estimated across all the other 
firms located in the same State in US; instrumental variable 
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP, Compustat 
INSTRU_short Average of short-term institutional ownership estimated across all the 
other firms located in the same State in US; instrumental variable 
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP, Compustat 
INSTRU_long Average of long-term institutional ownership estimated across all the 
other firms located in the same State in US; instrumental variable 
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP, Compustat 
IO_total Ratio of total stock holding percentage by all institutions over the shares 
outstanding at the end of quarter t-1 
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP 
IO_total_short Ratio of total stock holdings percentage by short-term institutions over the 
shares outstanding  
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP 
IO_total_long Ratio of total stock holdings percentage by long-term institutions over the 
shares outstanding  
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP 
IO_top5 Ratio of total stock holdings percentage by the largest five institutions 
over the shares outstanding  
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP 
IO_top5_short Ratio of total stock holdings percentage by short-term institutions out of 





IO_top5_long Ratio of total stock holdings percentage by long-term institutions out of 
the largest five institutions over the shares outstanding 
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP 
IO_block Ratio of total stock holdings percentage by all institutional blockholders 
over the shares outstanding 
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP 
IO_block_short Ratio of total stock holdings percentage by short-term institutional 
blockholders over the shares outstanding; 
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP 
IO_block_long Ratio of total stock holdings percentage by long-term institutional 
blockholders over the shares outstanding 
CDA/Spectrum s34, 
CRSP 
Firm Dummies Firm dummy variables, based on permno CRSP 
Year Dummies Year dummies, constructed for all years from 2001 to 2011 CRSP 
 
Table 10: Summary Statistics 
Panel A provides the summary statistics of the variables  






CDS_5y  13,446 0.0185 0.0467 0.004 0.0078 0.0184 
CRATE 13,894 1.545 0.280 1.386 1.609 1.792 
Slope 13,960 1.725 1.174 0.470 1.730 2.890 
Def 13,960 1.170 0.532 0.890 1.000 1.250 
ROA 13,960 0.011 0.022 0.005 0.012 0.021 
BM 13,960 0.446 0.542 0.257 0.418 0.646 
TAN 13,960 0.336 0.207 0.162 0.291 0.496 
LEV 13,960 0.310 0.172 0.194 0.288 0.397 
LNMKT 13,960 8.875 1.447 7.939 8.854 9.792 
LNSIZE 13,960 9.215 1.156 8.352 9.139 10.068 
Ret_t-3,t-1 13,960 0.027 0.194 -0.072 0.027 0.121 
Ret_t-12,t-4 13,960 0.099 0.382 -0.111 0.072 0.255 
LOGP 13,960 3.392 0.744 3.013 3.495 3.913 
TURN 13,960 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.011 
VOL 13,960 0.022 0.014 0.013 0.018 0.026 
DIV 13,960 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.007 
SP500 13,960 0.980 0.140 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IO_total 13,960 0.690 0.167 0.601 0.714 0.807 
IO_total_short 13,960 0.284 0.122 0.194 0.270 0.363 
IO_total_long 13,960 0.406 0.119 0.333 0.408 0.484 
IO_block 11,615 0.183 0.111 0.092 0.160 0.249 
IO_block_short 11,615 0.059 0.075 0.000 0.052 0.095 
IO_block_long 11,615 0.124 0.097 0.059 0.106 0.173 
IO_top5 13,960 0.260 0.090 0.198 0.250 0.310 
IO_top5_short 13,960 0.080 0.075 0.028 0.061 0.119 






Panel B: provides the Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables  
  CRATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
SLOPE  1 0.04                   
DEF 2 0.00 0.08                  
LNSIZE 3 0.40 0.06 0.00                 
Ret_t-3,t-1 4 0.03 0.08 -0.28 -0.03                
VOL 5 -0.35 0.18 0.46 -0.19 -0.19               
LEV 6 -0.48 0.14 0.09 -0.04 -0.09 0.39              
ROA 7 0.35 -0.08 -0.11 0.08 0.11 -0.38 -0.48             
BM 8 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.04            
TAN 9 -0.05 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.01 -0.03 0.29 -0.09 0.08           
IO_all 10 -0.16 -0.11 0.02 -0.24 0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.06 -0.18          
IO_all_short 11 -0.32 -0.15 0.02 -0.37 -0.01 0.16 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.15 0.76         
IO_all_long 12 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.15 0.10 0.11 -0.11 0.72 0.10        
IO_block 13 -0.46 -0.10 -0.01 -0.40 0.03 0.23 0.31 -0.23 0.04 -0.06 0.53 0.39 0.40       
IO_block_short 14 -0.46 -0.14 0.04 -0.40 -0.02 0.25 0.27 -0.22 -0.04 -0.08 0.42 0.73 -0.13 0.61      
IO_block_long 15 -0.23 -0.02 -0.05 -0.19 0.05 0.10 0.18 -0.12 0.09 -0.02 0.35 -0.06 0.61 0.80 0.02     
IO_largest 16 -0.29 -0.09 -0.03 -0.30 0.03 0.15 0.16 -0.12 -0.03 -0.08 0.45 0.26 0.41 0.78 0.38 0.69    
IO_top5 17 -0.39 -0.10 0.00 -0.37 0.03 0.20 0.24 -0.18 0.04 -0.06 0.71 0.49 0.56 0.92 0.55 0.73 0.86   
IO_top5_short 18 -0.44 -0.15 0.01 -0.42 -0.01 0.23 0.24 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.45 0.81 -0.16 0.54 0.95 -0.03 0.39 0.54  






Panel C: List of the largest twenty institutional investors at the end of year 2006 and 2011, respectively.  
This table provide the rank, name, the market value of stock holdings (in $Million), short-term and long-term type classification based on average churn 
rate of Equation (3), and legal type for the largest twenty institutional investors from Thomson-Reuters database. Full legal types of institutions are 
provided by Brain Bushee, including bank trust (BNK), insurance company (INS), investment company (INV), independent investment advisor (IIA), 
corporate (private) pension fund (CPS), public pension fund (PPS), university and foundation endowments (UFE) and miscellaneous (MSC).  
 















1 BARCLAYS BANK PLC $709,233  0 BNK  BLACKROCK INC $685,919  0 IIA 
2 FIDELITY MGMT & RESEARCH (US) $594,613  1 INV  VANGUARD GROUP, INC. $619,553  0 INV 
3 CAPITAL RESEARCH & MGMT CO. $531,613  0 INV  STATE STR CORPORATION $557,740  0 BNK 
4 STATE STR CORPORATION $498,334  0 BNK  FIDELITY MGMT & RESEARCH CO $473,932  1 INV 
5 MELLON BANK NA $431,523  0 BNK  T. ROWE PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC. $277,247  0 IIA 
6 VANGUARD GROUP, INC. $430,636  0 INV  CAPITAL WORLD INVESTORS $257,617  0 IIA 
7 AXA FINANCIAL, INC. $314,788  1 INS  WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT CO, LLP $248,770  1 IIA 
8 WELLINGTON MGMT CO, L.L.P. $296,999  1 IIA  MELLON BANK NA $232,427  0 BNK 
9 LEGG MASON INC $206,545  0 INV  CAPITAL RESEARCH GBL INVESTORS $221,047  0 IIA 
10 T. ROWE PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC. $204,944  0 IIA  JPMORGAN CHASE & COMPANY $188,281  1 BNK 
11 GOLDMAN SACHS & COMPANY $195,777  1 IIA  NORTHERN TRUST CORP $184,711  0 BNK 
12 DEUTSCHE BK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT $194,044  1 BNK  AMVESCAP PLC LONDON $167,250  0 MSC 
13 NORTHERN TRUST CORP $187,411  0 BNK  MSDW & COMPANY $147,324  0 IIA 
14 J.P MORGAN CHASE & CO. $163,893  1 BNK  FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC $127,321  0 INV 
15 MSDW & COMPANY $159,360  0 IIA  COLUMBIA MGMT INV ADVISERS LLC $126,032  0 IIA 
16 FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC $144,756  0 INV  BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION $125,063  0 BNK 
17 COLLEGE RETIRE EQUITIES $131,264  0 INS  GOLDMAN SACHS & COMPANY $121,806  1 IIA 
18 JANUS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC $117,713  1 INV  COLLEGE RETIRE EQUITIES $102,746  0 INS 
19 DODGE & COX $117,359  0 IIA  MFS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT $87,588  0 INV 




Table 11: Determinants of institutional ownership 
This table shows the fixed effect regression results from the following model. Columns (1)-(3) show the total ownership by institutional 
investors, short-term institutional investors, and long-term institutional investors, respectively. Concentrated ownership by different types 
of institutional investors are shown in columns (4) – (9). We control both firm and year fixed effects. T-values are reported in parentheses. 
The final two rows of the table present the number of observations along with the adjusted R
2
 . ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.                                                                                                          
                                                                                                         
 
IO_total 
















long  (9) 
          
Instru_all 0.378*** 
  




 (2.88)    (3.57)   
Instru_short 0.677*** 
 




  (6.27)    (8.73)  
Instru_long 
 
1.002***    0.548***    0.636***  
   
(15.38)    (9.17)    (11.94) 
LNMKT 0.027 -0.003 0.027  -0.03* -0.017* -0.015  -0.010 -0.018** 0.005 
 
(1.24) (-0.25) (1.58)  (-1.95) (-1.86) (-0.99)  (-0.95) (-2.47) (0.45) 
RET_t-3, t-1 0.020*** 0.023*** -0.006  0.007 -0.008** 0.013**  0.007 -0.004 0.008 
 
(2.99) (4.61) (-0.97)  (0.97) (-2.02) (2)  (1.2) (-1.08) (1.41) 
RET_t-12,t-4 0.006 0.018*** -0.012***  -0.003 -0.005 0.002  -0.001 -0.002 0.00 
 
(1.46) (4.86) (-3.43)  (-0.61) (-1.53) (0.41)  (-0.47) (-0.73) (0.19) 
LOGP -0.031 0.001 -0.029  -0.010 0.002 -0.011  -0.014 0.006 -0.018 
 
(-1.33) (0.05) (-1.57)  (-0.56) (0.23) (-0.64)  (-1.08) (0.75) (-1.37) 
TURN 2.558*** 2.773*** -0.421  -0.266 0.676*** -1.067***  -0.298 0.616** -1.077*** 
 
(4.62) (6.17) (-1.12)  (-0.65) (2.67) (-2.73)  (-0.97) (2.33) (-3.12) 
VOL -1.356*** -0.596*** -0.639***  -0.321* -0.123 -0.13  -0.295** -0.107 -0.089 
 
(-6.85) (-4.36) (-4.09)  (-1.86) (-1.04) (-0.91)  (-2.34) (-1.01) (-0.7) 
BM 0.010 -0.006 0.0181**  0.003 0.003 0.001  0.008 0.005 0.004 
 
(0.85) (-0.64) (2.25)  (0.31) (0.43) (0.16)  (1.11) (0.89) (0.61) 
LEV -0.020 -0.088*** 0.072***  0.005 -0.018 0.026  0.028 -0.023 0.054** 
 
(-0.53) (-3.28) (2.6)  (0.14) (-0.84) (0.87)  (1.17) (-1.26) (2.24) 
ROA 0.074 0.127*** -0.053  -0.086 -0.029 -0.057  -0.029 0.006 -0.037 
 
(1.02) (2.78) (-0.79)  (-1.09) (-0.59) (-0.77)  (-0.49) (0.16) (-0.6) 
DIV -1.045 -1.969*** 0.828  0.588 -0.82*** 1.350  0.419 -0.972*** 1.314* 
 
(-1.06) (-4.41) (1.01)  (0.61) (-2.82) (1.54)  (0.55) (-3.45) (1.81) 
SP500 -0.224*** -0.189*** -0.014  0.024 -0.024** 0.062***  -0.007 -0.023*** 0.033** 
 





Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 13,960 13,960 13,960  11,615 11,615 11,615  13,960 13,960 13,960 
Adj. R2 0.8154 0.7284 0.6838  0.5633 0.4561 0.5081  0.681 0.5357 0.5633 
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Table 12: Hausman (1978) tests of Endogeneity 
This table reports the coefficients of the resid the CDS equation (6): 
                                                                                                    
                                                                               
Where resid is the regression residual we get from regression of equation (5). We only report the 
coefficient estimate, t_statistic and p_statistic of resid, corresponding to each ownership proxy, 
other estimates and statistics for firm and market characteristic variables are not reported. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Variable Coefficient T_Stat P_Stat 
RESID（IO_total） 0.104 1.52 0.1289 
RESID (IO_total_short) 0.155*** 2.91 0.0038 
RESID (IO_total_long) -0.114*** -3.04 0.0025 
RESID (IO_block) -0.778*** -5.39 <.0001 
RESID (IO_block_short) -0.838*** -5.45 <.0001 
RESID (IO_block_long) -0.403*** -4.66 <.0001 
RESID (IO_top5) -0.988*** -4.5 <.0001 
RESID (IO_top5_short) -0.515*** -3.95 <.0001 


















Table 13: Impact of institutional ownership and trading on firms’ credit spreads 
Panel A shows the results of the second stage of 2sls regression equation (7) to examine the 
impact of total institutional ownership, ownership by short-term institutional investors and by 
long-term institutional investors on firms’ credit spreads.  Panel B shows the results of the second 
stage of 2sls regression equation (7) to examine the trading by institutional investors on firms’ 
credit spreads. T-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
The final two rows of the table present the number of observations for each regression along with 
the adjusted R
2
. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
Panel A. Regression of five-year CDS spread on institutional ownership.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.248** 0.271** 0.301** 0.27** 
 (2.12) (2.18) (2.41) (2.23) 
IO_total -0.036** 0.057 -0.214**  
 (-2.17) (0.88) (-2.45)  
IO_total_short  -0.227***  -0.17*** 
  (-3.2)  (-2.62) 
IO_total_long   0.173*** 0.065** 
   (3.23) (2.18) 
CRATE -0.17** -0.173** -0.173** -0.173** 
 (-2.43) (-2.46) (-2.47) (-2.47) 
SLOPE 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.47) (3.26) (3.34) (3.3) 
DEF -0.002 -0.001 -0.00 -0.001 
 (-1.23) (-0.76) (-0.14) (-0.52) 
LNSIZE 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.18) (-0.02) (0.05) (-0.07) 
RET_t-3,t-1 -0.02*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (-3.00) (-3.05) (-3.03) (-3.05) 
VOL 1.32*** 1.334*** 1.291*** 1.339*** 
 (6.70) (6.41) (6.52) (6.46) 
ROA -0.198*** -0.173*** -0.179*** -0.173*** 
 (-3.95) (-3.39) (-3.49) (-3.32) 
BM -0.038*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.041*** 
 (-2.66) (-2.76) (-2.73) (-2.74) 
TAN 0.003 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 
 (0.12) (-0.05) (0.01) (-0.04) 
Firm & Year  
Fixed Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 13,388 13,388 13,388 13,388 





Panel B. Regression of five-year CDS spread on institutional trading. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.02 -0.031 0.015 -0.026 
 (-0.13) (-0.19) (0.09) (-0.16) 
Lag_IO_all -0.129* 0.090 -0.269***  
 (-1.78) (1.16) (-2.66)  
∆IO_all -0.149** -0.003 -0.217**  
 (-2.04) (-0.05) (-2.4)  
LAG_IO_all_short  -0.298***  -0.215*** 
  (-3.49)  (-3.06) 
∆IO_all_short  -0.178***  -0.174** 
  (-2.73)  (-2.4) 
LAG_IO_all_long   0.243*** 0.1** 
   (3.44) (2.38) 
∆IO_all_long   0.127*** 0.019 
   (2.97) (0.8) 
CRATE 0.023 0.019 0.015 0.016 
 (0.27) (0.2) (0.16) (0.17) 
SLOPE 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (3.3) (2.78) (3.01) (2.9) 
DEF -0.002 -0.00 0.001 0.001 
 (-1.25) (-0.04) (0.75) (0.39) 
LNSIZE 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.59) (-0.25) (-0.24) (-0.36) 
RET_t-3,t-1 -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 
 (-3.04) (-3.16) (-3.18) (-3.2) 
VOL 1.291*** 1.355*** 1.304*** 1.359*** 
 (6.18) (6.12) (6.23) (6.24) 
ROA -0.201*** -0.176*** -0.178*** -0.173*** 
 (-3.7) (-3.26) (-3.24) (-3.12) 
BM -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.044*** 
 (-2.73) (-2.81) (-2.79) (-2.81) 
TAN -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
 (-0.12) (-0.37) (-0.3) (-0.36) 
Firm & Year  
Fixed Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 12,691 12,691 12,691 12,691 






Table 14: Impact of concentrated ownership on firms’ credit spreads 
This table shows the results of the second stage of 2sls regression equation (7) to test the impact 
of concentrated ownership by institutional investors on firms’ credit spreads. We use ownership 
by blockholders who own at least 5% of firms’ total outstanding shares, and ownership by the 
largest five institutions to measure the firm’s ownership concentration. T-value are reported in 
parentheses. The final two rows of the table present the number of observations for each 
regression along with the adjusted R
2
. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.   
 
 Variable (1) (2)     Variable  (3) (4)  
Intercept -0.023 0.024   Intercept -0.079 0.064 
 (-0.18) (0.18)    (0052) (0.6032) 
IO_block 0.747***    IO_top5 0.977***  
 (4.77)     (4.58)  
IO_block_short 0.811***   IO_top5_short 0.637*** 
  (4.82)     (4.42) 
IO_block_long 0.428***   IO_top5_long 0.366*** 
  (4.29)     (4) 
CRATE -0.171** -0.17**   CRATE -0.172** -0.17** 
 (-2.18) (-2.3)    (-2.26) (-2.41) 
SLOPE 0.003*** 0.004***   SLOPE 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (3.57) (3.99)    (3.76) (3.99) 
DEF -0.00 0.001   DEF -0.001 -0.00 
 (-0.22) (0.26)    (-0.47) (-0.01) 
LNSIZE 0.02*** 0.016***   LNSIZE 0.015*** 0.009*** 
 (4.35) (4.14)    (3.9) (3.03)  
RET_t-3,t-1 -0.037*** -0.032***   RET_t-3,t-1 -0.035*** -0.026*** 
 (-3.95) (-3.84)    (-3.83) (-3.53) 
VOL 1.213*** 1.219***   VOL 1.309*** 1.317*** 
 (7.26) (7.05)    (7.01) (6.73) 
ROA -0.067 -0.099*   ROA -0.081 -0.146*** 
 (-1.15) (-1.86)    (-1.46) (-2.94) 
BM -0.046*** -0.045***   BM -0.047*** -0.043*** 
 (-3.07) (-3.01)    (-3.07) (-2.9) 
TAN 0.008 0.008   TAN 0.006 0.008 
 (0.45) (0.49)    (0.35) (0.44) 
Firm, Year 




Fixed Effects YES YES 
Obs. 11,113 11,113   Obs. 13,388 13,388 






Table 15: Crisis vs. normal period 
Panel A shows the second stage regression results of 2sls equation (7) for our sub-sample from 
2001 to 2006, where Panel B shows the results for our sample during crisis period. This table 
corresponds to section 4.1, Table 5 Panel A. The final two rows of the table present the number of 
observations for each regression along with the adjusted R
2
 . Standard errors are clustered at firm 
level, ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Panel A:2001-2006 




















Intercept 0.216*** 4.32 0.239*** 4.68 0.191*** 3.8 0.21*** 3.82 








   
0.086*** 2.65 0.062** 2.36 
CRATE -0.179*** -5.32 -0.183*** -5.43 -0.179*** -5.37 -0.185*** -5.38 
SLOPE 0.000 0.35 0.00 0.44 0.001** 1.98 0.001* 1.79 
DEF 0.007*** 4.33 0.006*** 3.62 0.004*** 2.95 0.004*** 3.22 
LNSIZE 0.005 1.23 0.005 1.41 0.005 1.36 0.006 1.44 
RET_t-3,t-1 -0.011** -1.97 -0.015*** -2.63 -0.01* -1.93 -0.014** -2.58 
VOL 0.987*** 6.19 0.991*** 6.27 1.035*** 6.01 1.04*** 5.69 
ROA -0.177*** -3.84 -0.147*** -3.13 -0.173*** -3.85 -0.148*** -3.19 
BM -0.011 -0.63 -0.015 -0.89 -0.011 -0.65 -0.015 -0.87 
TAN 0.011 0.76 0.007 0.5 0.01 0.7 0.008 0.53 




































Panel B 2007-2008       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.425*** 0.398*** 0.442*** 0.403*** 0.245** 0.294** 
 3.7 3.54 3.83 3.46 2.26 2.56 
IO_all -0.019 -0.020 -0.017    
 -1.15 -1.22 -1.02    
IO_all_short 0.092**  0.067   
  2.43  1.57   
IO_all_long  -0.064** -0.051*   
   -2.39 -1.72   
IO_block    0.525***  
     4.41  
IO_block_short     0.476*** 
      4.5 
IO_block_long     0.033 
      0.67 
rate -0.19*** -0.191*** -0.19*** -0.189*** -0.188*** -0.189*** 
 -4 -4.06 -4 -3.87 -3.8 -3.83 
slope -0.005** -0.004* -0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** 0.00 
 -2.48 -1.79 -0.33 -0.57 -2.66 0.13 
def 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 2.93 3.06 3.39 3.24 2.89 3.09 
size1 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.005 -0.006 
 -1.37 -1.33 -1.35 -1.29 -0.62 -0.68 
RET_3 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009** -0.009** 
 -0.12 -0.13 -0.17 -0.19 -2.01 -1.99 
Vol_63 1.140*** 1.152*** 1.178*** 1.178*** 0.982*** 1.01*** 
 3.93 3.96 3.95 3.96 3.79 3.86 
roa -0.088 -0.090 -0.088 -0.09 -0.07 -0.069 
 -1.44 -1.48 -1.44 -1.49 -1.22 -1.21 
bm2 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 
 -0.99 -1.03 -0.93 -1.01 -1.37 -0.94 
tan2 -0.011 -0.008 -0.01 -0.006 -0.01 -0.009 
 -0.24 -0.17 -0.22 -0.13 -0.23 -0.21 
Firm, Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 2829 2829 2829 2829 2829 2829 
Adj. R 0.6937 0.6409 0.6404 0.6403 0.6513 0.6532 
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Table 16: Institutional ownership and CDS contracts with different maturities 
Panel A shows the impact of institutional ownership on firms’ short-run and long-run credit risk, measured by the credit spreads of CDS 
contracts with maturities ranging from 1-year to 20-year. We only report the coefficients and t-statistics (in parenthesis) of ownership 
variables only. Estimates of control variables are not reported here. Firm and year fixed effects are all considered.  Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level.The final raw of the table present the adjusted R
2
 . ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.   
 











          
IO_all -0.057*   -0.05*   -0.045**   -0.028*   -0.028*  
 (-2.03)   (-1.94)   (-2.12)   (-1.90)   (-1.94)  
IO_all_short -0.292***   -0.266***   -0.228***   -0.157***   -0.147*** 
  (-2.63)   (-2.81)   (-2.92)   (-2.63)   (-2.68) 
IO_all_long 0.079   0.086*   0.061*   0.06**   0.072*** 
  (0.126)   (1.94)   (1.69)   (2.35)   (2.84) 
Adj. R2 0.3810 0.385  0.4450 0.4504  0.4798 0.4843  0.5543 0.5587  0.5809 0.5850 











          
IO_block 1.039***   0.978***   0.834***   0.699***   0.711***  
 (4.11)   (4.26)   (4.42)   (5.04)   (5.32)  
IO_block_short 1.090***   0.977***   0.862***   0.737***   0.732*** 
  (3.94)   (4.12)   (4.34)   (5.11)   (5.33) 
IO_block_long 0.591***   0.571***   0.486***   0.395***   0.398*** 
  (3.81)   (3.95)   (4.03)   (4.47)   (4.69) 




Table 17: Robust Checks 
Panel A shows the results of the second stage of 2sls regression equation (7) to test the impact of 
institutional investors on firms’ credit spreads. Following Yan and Zhang (2009) we separate 
institutions into three tertile portfolios based on         . Institutions ranked in the top tertile 
with the highest          are classified as short-term institutional investors and those ranked in 
the bottom tertile are classified as long-term institutional investors. All the control variables, firm 
fixed and year fixed effects are taken into account but not report here. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level. The final two rows of the table present the number of observations for 
each regression along with the adjusted R
2
. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel B shows use an alternative definition of portfolio turnover, i.e. churn rate in Equation (3)’: 
       
        
          
      (        )
∑               
  
   
 . This panel shows the results of the second stage of 2sls 
regression equation (7) to test the impact of institutional investors on firms’ credit spreads. All the 
control variables, firm fixed and year fixed effects are taken into account but not report here. 
Standard errors are clustered at firm level. The final two rows of the table present the number of 
observations for each regression along with the adjusted R
2
. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Panel C shows the results of fixed effect panel regression using Bushee’s (1998, 2001) 
classification of institutional investors. Firm fixed and year fixed effects are controlled. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm level. The final two rows of the table present the number of 
observations for each regression along with the adjusted R
2
. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 
Panel A: Institutional types based on sorted tertile portfolio of turnover ratio on Equation (3) 
Full sample period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.294** 0.233** 0.260** 0.132 0.082 
 (2.47) (2.01) (2.20) (1.07) (0.64) 
IO_total -0.033** -0.040**    
 (-2.07) (-2.31)    
IO_total_short -0.225**  -0.218**   
 (-2.06)  (-2.01)   
IO_total_long  0.171*** 0.100***   
  (2.66) (2.20)   
IO_top5_short    1.481***  
    (4.36)  
IO_top5_long    0.382***  
    (3.67)  
IO_block_short     3.206*** 
     (5.65) 
IO_block_long     0.724*** 
     (3.96) 
Adj. R2 0.5168 0.5177 0.516 0.522 0.546 
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Panel B: Institutional types based on alternative definition of turnover ratio on Equation (3)’ 
Full sample period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.315** 0.238** 0.29** -0.005 0.025 
 2.37 2.07 2.37 0.135 0.2 
IO_all -0.03* -0.039**    
  -1.88 -2.28    
IO_total_short -0.1817  -0.181**   
  -2.53  -2.49   
IO_total_long  0.115*** 0.059**   
  3.13 2.21   
IO_block_short    0.834***  
    4.5  
IO_block_long    0.449***  
    3.45  
IO_top5_short     0.782*** 
     4.39 
IO_top5_long     0.331*** 
     3.91 
Adj. R2 0.5188 0.5167 0.5172 0.5475 0.5342 
Panel C: Bushee’s (1998, 2001) classification of institutional types 
 Normal Period: 2001-2007  Crisis Period: 2007-2008 
Variable Coefficient T_ Stat P_Stat  Coefficient T_ Stat P_ Stat 
Intercept 0.21*** 4.11 <.0001 0.441506 3.76 0.0002 
Transient Own -0.042* -1.84 0.0661  -0.049 -1.59 0.1131 
Dedicated Own -0.014 -0.87 0.3842  -0.033* -1.66 0.0975 
Quasi-index Own -0.003 -0.23 0.8184  -0.03* -1.72 0.087 
Adj. R2 0.696    0.6422   
 
 
 
